Spatial Sorting of Workers and Firms∗

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Abstract

Why do productive workers and firms locate together in dense cities? I develop a new theory of two-sided sorting in which both heterogeneous workers and firms sort across space. Three forces are essential for generating spatial disparities: complementarity between worker and firm productivity, random matching within frictional local labor markets, and congestion costs. I demonstrate that the equilibrium exhibits excessive concentration of workers and firms, and dispersing them away from dense locations can mitigate congestion without reducing output. I then provide direct empirical evidence of two-sided sorting using German administrative microdata. An exogenous increase in the quality of the local workforce results in more productive firms choosing the same location. Finally, to quantify the implications of the model, I calibrate it to U.S. regional data and show that policies which relocate workers and firms toward less dense areas can increase welfare.

Keywords: Two-sided sorting, local labor markets, spatial inequality, spatial policies

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1. Introduction

In the U.S., the share of college graduates is 40% in the top decile of Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) ranked by population density and only 26% in the bottom decile (ACS, 2017). In addition, almost half of Fortune 500 companies are headquartered in just 10 large cities (Fortune, 2022). This concentration of productive workers and firms results in spatial disparities that motivate various government policies, such as place-based policies and local regulations, which are designed to encourage or restrict the inflow of workers and firms. Evaluation of these policies requires understanding the determinants of the sorting of workers and firms. So far, the literature has primarily focused on either local productivity differences, stemming from infrastructure and geography, or externalities such as knowledge spillovers.1

In this paper, I propose a new theory of two-sided sorting: Workers and firms with different productivity sort across space, mutually incentivizing each other’s sorting, and endogenously generate spatial disparities. Two-sided sorting provides the distinct normative implications compared to one-sided sorting. Consider Austin, TX—a rising tech hub—as an example. The inflow of productive companies, such as Oracle and Tesla, attracts a skilled workforce. Similarly, the presence of productive workers makes the city more attractive to high-tech firms. Because both workers and firms move simultaneously, this relocation does not necessarily change aggregate output. Empirically, I provide direct evidence of two-sided sorting and quantify the implications of the mechanism by calibrating the model and evaluating real-world policies.

I begin the analysis by developing a parsimonious theory of spatial sorting of heterogeneous workers and heterogeneous firms across ex ante homogeneous locations. Their location decisions are interdependent, since they interact in local markets. In each local labor market, workers and firms randomly match subject to search frictions. Importantly, due to complementarity between their productivities, more productive workers produce more when they are matched with more productive firms, and vice versa. In addition, housing and business services are elastically supplied, but the costs of living or operating a business are higher in denser locations.

I show that more productive workers and more productive firms together choose denser areas. Due to random matching within each local market, labor markets with either better firms or a larger number of

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1 Both the sorting of workers (e.g., Behrens, Duranton and Robert-Nicoud, 2014; Davis and Dingel, 2020; Martellini, 2022) and the sorting of firms (e.g., Bilal, 2023; Gaubert, 2018; Lindenlaub, Oh and Peters, 2023) have been recognized as significant sources of spatial inequality.
firms (relative to the number of workers) are more attractive to all workers. Thus, these locations attract a greater number of workers until the local congestion in the form of high housing rents outweighs the benefits from local labor markets. In particular, due to worker-firm complementarity, more productive workers benefit most from these labor markets, and thus are willing to pay higher housing rents. In principle, these locations can be attractive to workers even with less productive firms if the number of firms is large enough. However, this possibility is ruled out in equilibrium. The decisions of less productive firms imply that local labor markets in this area are unattractive to firms. As a result, higher congestion costs due to a larger number of firms render these locations undesirable for any firm, which contradicts the firm sorting conditions. Therefore, the equilibrium exhibits positive assortative matching (PAM) between workers and firms across space. Importantly, the sorting of workers sustains the sorting of firms, and vice versa, which shows that two-sided sorting alone—without the presence of location heterogeneity such as local TFP differences or agglomeration forces—can explain the spatial disparities observed in the data.

I then evaluate the efficiency of the decentralized equilibrium and demonstrate that it features excessive concentration in dense areas. The key insight is that productivity is embodied in workers and firms, which emphasizes who produces rather than where the production occurs. Thus, there is no need to concentrate workers and firms in denser areas, since this only raises aggregate congestion costs. However, in the decentralized equilibrium, less productive workers overvalue denser locations more than a planner does. They do not internalize their negative impact on local firms that might otherwise have hired more productive workers. Similarly, less productive firms choose denser locations than desired from a social point of view, and these externalities lead to excess congestion costs. The government can restore efficiency by taxing workers and firms in dense areas, which relocates them to less congested areas.

Before I calibrate the model, I present evidence of two-sided sorting using German employer-employee matched data. First, I use the model to recover the productivity of workers and firms in each location from two-way fixed-effects estimates in a wage regression. In particular, I take into account that wages depend not only on the worker-firm productivity of a given match, but also on local labor market outcomes—the average productivity of firms and job finding rates. I then instrument changes in overall worker productivity using exogenous variation in incoming domestic migrant productivity based on migration networks in the pre-period and contemporaneous shocks to origin locations. This instrument
addresses potential endogeneity concerns arising from changes in regional economic conditions such as local TFP growth that may boost both local worker and firm productivity. To address the identification threat from agglomeration forces, I further control for productivity changes in preexisting jobs, which benefit from these forces as new jobs. My analysis suggests that a 1 standard deviation increase in the quality of the local workforce attracts firms that are about 0.51 standard deviation more productive firms to the same location. This finding supports the view that the location decisions of firms respond to those of workers, which supports two-sided sorting as an important driver of spatial disparities.

To evaluate the quantitative potential of the framework in explaining spatial disparities and use it as a tool for policy evaluation, I calibrate the model using cross-sectional data from the U.S. Despite its parsimony, the model successfully replicates economic outcomes across MSAs, such as wages and population density (namely, the urban wage premium), as well as housing rents. The key challenge to identification is to separately estimate the productivity of workers and firms across locations from wages, which reflect both. First, to identify the magnitude of worker sorting, I rely on their location decisions—i.e., revealed preferences. Nominal wages in denser areas are higher due to either the compensation for higher housing rents or the skill premium. Controlling for housing rents in the data, I estimate worker productivity differentials. Second, the remaining spatial gap in wages is attributed to firm sorting. My estimation results reveal that the spatial heterogeneity of workers and firms are both significant: Workers and firms in the top decile of locations in terms of population density are 24.4% and 20.4% more productive than those who are in the bottom decile, respectively.

Finally, I evaluate two real-world policies, which have a significant impact on the location decisions of workers and firms through the lens of my model. I show that the federal income tax cuts implemented through the Tax Cuts and Job Acts in 2017 is expected to have had a negative impact on welfare by causing dense regions to be more congested. Progressive income taxes on nominal wages reduce the attractiveness of working in dense cities, where workers earn higher income and thus pay more taxes. Therefore, lower and less progressive tax rates result in a significant inflow of workers into these regions. This migration is accompanied by a significant movement of firms, which results in a 25% increase in both worker and firm density in the top 10% dense cities. This substantial relocation further amplifies the concentration of economic activity in urban areas and thus exacerbates congestion costs. However, total output remains virtually unchanged, since both workers and firms jointly move, and welfare decreases
by 0.35% as a consequence. Next, I find that more stringent housing regulations in larger cities relative to smaller ones result in a 0.21% increase in welfare by reducing the inflow of workers into urban areas.

To highlight the distinct implications of two-sided sorting, I compare these results with those from a model that lacks heterogeneity in either workers or firms. For example, what if productivity is embodied in locations instead of firms, and this does not respond to policies? In that benchmark model, more productive workers sort into more productive locations, while firms are homogeneous. I show that the welfare implications of the federal income tax cuts yield the opposite sign. Since a larger number of workers produce in more productive locations, output increases by 0.68% and welfare by 0.47%. Similarly, housing regulations have the opposite impact, leading to a welfare loss of 0.66%. These comparisons highlight the fact that although different mechanisms may equally succeed in explaining spatial disparities in the data, incorporating two-sided sorting leads to qualitatively different policy implications.

**Related literature.** A large literature on spatial disparities focuses on the spatial sorting of either heterogeneous workers or heterogeneous firms across ex ante heterogeneous locations. Different types of workers and firms value different location fundamentals differently, and this affects their location choices. The importance of worker sorting in spatial inequalities has been extensively studied, both empirically and theoretically (e.g., Baum-Snow and Pavan, 2012; De la Roca, Ottaviano and Puga, 2023; Diamond, 2016). Other work finds that the spatial sorting of firms also plays an important role (e.g., Bilal, 2023; Lindenlaub, Oh and Peters, 2023). Another body of literature shows that sorting can happen across ex ante homogeneous or symmetric locations, via agglomeration forces that lead to complementarity between agent types and endogenous city characteristics (e.g., Davis and Dingel, 2019; Behrens, Duranton and Robert-Nicoud, 2014; Gaubert, 2018). I too assume that locations are ex ante homogeneous. However, instead of spillovers, complementarity between worker and firm productivity leads to sorting. In contrast to those papers, I am the first to show that two-sided sorting alone can endogenously generate dense areas populated by productive workers and firms.

There are a few studies that analyze frictional local labor markets across space. Kline and Moretti (2013) present a model that combines the Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides framework (e.g., Pissarides, 2000) and the Roback (1982) framework. Studies extend this model to account for spatial differences in unemployment rates through firm sorting and the resulting differential separation rates (Bilal, 2023).
or through endogenous separations and on-the-job search (Kuhn, Manovskii and Qiu, 2022). I also combine the standard Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides framework with a spatial equilibrium model but emphasize an additional role of search frictions. In addition to generating the spatial unemployment gap, I further highlight the role of random matching under search frictions as a driving force in generating differential population densities across space.

I also build on the literature on two-sided matching. Complementarity in payoffs has been the key source of assortative matching in competitive markets (e.g., Becker, 1973); frictional markets (e.g., Shimer and Smith, 2000; Eeckhout and Kircher, 2010); and the game theoretic approach (e.g., Roth and Sotomayor, 1990). In this paper, while complementarity between worker and firm productivity in output remains crucial for achieving PAM, I introduce two important modifications. First, assortative matching is realized through location decisions. Whereas the role of locations resembles the concept of matches, a worker’s value depends not only on her employer, but also on other workers and firms within the same location who interact through local markets. In this context, locations serve as platforms on which these matches occur. Second, in my model, the density of workers and firms at each location is endogenously determined by an effectively elastic land supply. Consequently, the model not only characterizes the matching between types of agents but also the endogenous measure of agents within each such matching.²

Finally, my findings are related to studies on spatial policies and spatial misallocation. On the one hand, spatial policies can introduce distortions in the spatial distribution of economic activities. Examples include federal income taxes, stricter housing regulations in larger cities, and differences in state taxes (e.g., Albouy, 2009; Fajgelbaum et al., 2019; Hsieh and Moretti, 2019). On the other hand, a decentralized equilibrium can often be inefficient and require policy interventions. For example, when agglomeration forces exist across heterogeneous workers, spatial transfers can increase welfare (e.g., Fajgelbaum and Gaubert, 2020; Rossi-Hansberg, Sarte and Schwartzman, 2019). Studies typically address these questions by building on a quantitative spatial model (e.g., Allen and Arkolakis, 2014; Redding, 2016), in which location heterogeneity, such as geography and amenities, or agglomeration forces play a crucial role. In contrast, I provide two insights that solely arise from the sorting mechanism. First, it

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² More general matching models account for externalities or endogenize the number of agents of a match. However, these models often make specific assumptions about values, which renders them not directly applicable to my context. For example, externalities arise from aggregate variables—such as economy-wide pollution—or values depend only on the types of agents, and are assumed to be independent of the number of agents. Notably, when the worker and firm density of each location is exogenous, I can apply the results of Demange and Gale (1985) or Roth and Sotomayor (1990).
demonstrates that dispersion in marginal labor productivity does not necessarily imply misallocation in the presence of sorting. Second, it reveals that the sorting of heterogeneous workers and firms into frictional labor markets generates externalities, which suggests the possibility of improving welfare through spatial policies. This result is related to the discussion whereby externalities arising from search frictions cannot be canceled out by the Hosios condition when agents are heterogeneous (e.g., Acemoglu, 2001; Bilal, 2023; Shimer and Smith, 2001).

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and solves for an equilibrium. Section 3 characterizes its properties and discusses the efficiency. Section 4 provides empirical evidence of two-sided sorting, and Section 5 discusses the identification strategy and presents estimation results. Finally, I evaluate policies in Section 6 and conclude.

2. The Economy

This section presents a model of spatial disparities that originates from the sorting of heterogeneous workers and firms. I first present the model and derive the equilibrium conditions.

2.1 Environment

Time indexed by \( t \) is continuous. There are ex ante homogeneous locations indexed by \( \ell \in [0, 1] \). Each location is endowed with a unit measure of land.

Workers and firms. The economy is populated by a measure \( M_w \) of infinitely lived risk-neutral heterogeneous workers. Workers differ in productivity \( x \in [\underline{x}, \overline{x}] \), drawn from the cdf \( Q_w(\cdot) \). I assume that \( Q_w \) is twice continuously differentiable. Workers consume housing \( h_t \) and tradable goods \( g_t \), which I assume as the numeraire. Housing is a strict necessity, and flow utility is given by \( g_t \) when they rent \( \hat{h} \) units of housing at rate \( r_\ell(\ell) \). There is no utility from leisure, and workers inelastically supply one unit of labor. Workers discount the future at rate \( \rho \). At time 0, workers choose locations in which to reside and work, but can change locations at any time. If workers are employed, they earn a flow wage. If workers are unemployed, they receive unemployment benefit \( b x \),\(^3\) which is financed by a lump-sum tax.

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\(^3\) This assumption is widely used in the macro-labor literature for tractability (e.g., Postel-Vinay and Robin, 2002).
Figure 1. Local Labor Market: Timeline

The economy is populated by a measure $M_f$ of risk-neutral firms with a discount rate $\rho$. Firms differ in productivity $y \in [y, \bar{y}]$, drawn from the cdf $Q_f(\cdot)$, which is also assumed to be twice continuously differentiable. Firms choose a location to operate a business. At each point in time, they demand a unit of local business services at overhead cost $c_t(\ell)$. These costs are associated with renting commercial spaces, handling administrative procedures, advertising, or posting vacancies.

**Technology.** Workers and firms match one-to-one in a local labor market and produce a flow $x y$ of tradable goods.

**Search and wage.** At rate $\lambda_t(\ell)$, unemployed workers receive a job offer, become employed if they accept an offer, and earn a flow wage. Employed workers become unemployed at rate $\delta$ when the match is separated. Each firm posts one vacancy at each point in time. Posting an additional vacancy is prohibitively costly. At rate $\delta_v$, a vacancy gets destroyed. At rate $q_t(\ell)$, a vacancy contacts workers, and if the match is acceptable, production begins. This match gets separated at rate $\delta$ and becomes a vacated position that reenters the search market.

Upon matching, a flow wage $w_t(x, y, \ell)$ is determined by Nash bargaining with worker’s bargaining power $\beta$. The timing of events in each local labor market is summarized in Figure 1.

**Matching.** Search is random and matches are created by a constant-returns-to-scale matching function $M(U_t(\ell), V_t(\ell))$, where $U_t(\ell)$ is the measure of unemployed workers and $V_t(\ell)$ is the measure of vacancies measured by the efficiency unit. I assume that when a measure $N_t(\ell)$ of firms choose location $\ell$, a

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4 The production unit is a match between a vacancy and a worker. Thus, the notion of a firm is simply a collection of vacancies and filled positions. Throughout the paper, I use the terms vacancies or jobs to denote individual positions, depending on whether it is unmatched or matched, respectively.
measure \( \delta_v N(\ell) \) of efficiency unit of vacancies are created at each point in time.\(^5\) Thus, the effective measure of vacancies \( V(\ell) \) equals \( \delta_v \) times the number of vacancies posted. The matching function \( M(\cdot) \) is assumed to be increasing and concave in both of its arguments. Defining labor market tightness as \( \theta_t(\ell) = \frac{V_t(\ell)}{U_t(\ell)} \), contact rates can be represented as functions of market tightness, \( \lambda_t(\ell) = \lambda(\theta_t(\ell)) \) and \( q_t(\ell) = q(\theta_t(\ell)) \). I assume these functions are differentiable, and both \( \frac{\lambda'(\theta)}{\lambda(\theta)} \) and \( \frac{q'(\theta)}{q(\theta)} \) are bounded.

**Local suppliers and ownership.** Housing \( H_t(\ell) \) is competitively supplied by landowners, and the costs of supplying \( H \) unit of housing are given by \( C_r(H) \). In a business services market, competitive intermediaries provide services \( S_t(\ell) \) for business operations, and it costs them \( C_v(S) \) to provide units \( S \) of service. I assume that \( C_r(\cdot) \) and \( C_v(\cdot) \) are twice continuously differentiable, increasing, and convex. I further assume that they satisfy the Inada condition, \( \lim_{H \to 0} C''_r(H) = \lim_{S \to 0} C''_v(S) = \infty \). All workers own identical diversified portfolios of firms, landowners, and intermediaries.

### 2.2 Equilibrium

I assume the economy is in steady state. Thus, all equilibrium objects are time-invariant, and I will drop the time subscript \( t \) from this point onward.

In terms of the spatial sorting of workers and firms, I focus on the class of pure assignments between productivity \( x \) (\( y \), respectively) and location \( \ell \). In other words, any two workers (firms, respectively) of the same productivity are assigned to the same location, and any two workers (firms, respectively) in the same location have the same productivity. When an assignment is pure, I can define a location-matching function \( x(\ell) \) (\( y(\ell) \), respectively),\(^6\) which denotes the productivity of workers (firms, respectively) in local labor market \( \ell \).\(^7\)

Because locations are ex ante homogeneous, without loss of generality, I label \( \ell \) in such a way that \( x(\ell) \) is strictly increasing. Importantly, since housing is elastically supplied in each location, a measure of workers who choose \( \ell \) is endogenously determined as an equilibrium outcome, which is different

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\(^5\) Later, I consider a limit case in which vacancy destruction rate \( \delta_v \) is sufficiently large. However, increasing destruction rate \( \delta_v \) mechanically decreases the total number of vacancies. To avoid this problem, as a normalization, I assume that a single vacancy posting becomes more efficient in generating matches by introducing a notion of efficiency units of vacancies.

\(^6\) With slight abuse of notation, I will use \( x \) and \( y \) to indicate the productivity of each worker and firm, and \( x(\ell) \) and \( y(\ell) \) to denote the assignment.

\(^7\) Although many equilibria are not pure—e.g., assignments in which workers and firms randomly choose the location—they are not the focus of this paper. In Section 3.2, I show that the optimal assignment is pure. Moreover, the continuity assumption on \( Q_w \) eliminates concerns regarding workers with the same productivity who cannot be accommodated in a single location.
from the standard assignment problem of Becker (1973). For example, consider the two assignment candidates, $x_1(\ell)$ and $x_2(\ell)$, in the left panel of Figure 2. The assignment $x_2(\ell)$ indicates that higher-$\ell$ locations supply more housing and become denser, compared with $x_1(\ell)$. The same measure of workers, who have productivity higher than $x^*$, are concentrated in $[\ell_2, 1]$ under $x_2(\ell)$ and spread out in $[\ell_1, 1]$ under $x_1(\ell)$. In contrast, if housing supply were inelastic, $x(\ell)$ would be uniquely pinned down by the housing market clearing condition. Also, note that I do not impose any restrictions on $y(\ell)$ ex ante. Thus, it could either increase or decrease, as in the case of $y_1(\ell)$ or $y_2(\ell)$ in the right panel, or it could even be nonmonotonic.

**Values of workers and firms.** As a worker rents $\tilde{h}$ units of housing and then uses the remaining income to purchase tradable goods, the flow indirect utility is given by $I - \tilde{h}r(\ell)$, where $I$ denotes the flow income, which depends on her employment state. Let $V^u(x, \ell)$ denote the value of an unemployed worker of productivity $x$ in location $\ell$, and let $V^e(x, y, \ell)$ denote the value of an employed worker of productivity $x$ in location $\ell$ who is matched with a firm of productivity $y$. These values are characterized by the following equations:

$$\rho V^u(x, \ell) = bx + \Pi - \tilde{h} r(\ell) + \lambda(\ell) [V^e(x,y(\ell),\ell) - V^u(x,\ell)],$$

$$\rho V^e(x, y, \ell) = w(x,y,\ell) + \Pi - \tilde{h} r(\ell) - \delta [V^e(x,y,\ell) - V^u(x,\ell)],$$

where $y(\ell)$ denotes the productivity of firms in a local labor market in the candidate equilibrium with pure assignment, and $\Pi$ is the profit from a portfolio minus the lump-sum tax used to finance unemployment.
benefits. At rate $\lambda(\ell)$, she receives a job offer and becomes employed.\(^8\) An employed worker earns wage $w(x, y, \ell)$ until she becomes unemployed at rate $\delta$.

Let $V^v(y, \ell)$ denote the value of a vacancy that a firm of productivity $y$ enjoys when operating in location $\ell$, and let $V^p(x, y, \ell)$ denote the value of a job of productivity $y$ matched with a worker of productivity $x$ in location $\ell$. A vacancy either contacts a worker at rate $q(\ell)$ or gets destroyed at rate $\delta_v$. From a matched job, a firm earns a flow profit $xy - w(x, y, \ell)$ until the match separates at rate $\delta$. These values solve

$$
pV^v(y, \ell) = q(\ell) \max\{V^p(x, y, \ell) - V^v(y, \ell), 0\} - \delta_v V^v(y, \ell),
$$

(1)

$$
pV^p(x, y, \ell) = xy - w(x, y, \ell) - \delta[V^p(x, y, \ell) - V^v(y, \ell)],$$

where $x(\ell)$ denotes the productivity of unemployed workers in location $\ell$.

Define the surplus of the match between a worker and a job in location $\ell$ by $S(x, y, \ell) = V^e(x, y, \ell) - V^u(x, \ell) + V^p(x, y, \ell) - V^v(y, \ell)$—i.e., the sum of the worker and job surplus. Then the bargaining problem has a well-known solution, in which workers and firms receive constant shares of the surplus:

$$V^e(x, y, \ell) = V^u(x, \ell) + \beta S(x, y, \ell),$$

$$V^p(x, y, \ell) = V^u(y, \ell) + (1 - \beta) S(x, y, \ell).$$

Appendix A.1 presents all derivations. A worker of productivity $x$ matched with a firm of productivity $y$ enjoys her reservation unemployment utility $V^u(x, \ell)$ plus a share $\beta$ of the surplus, and the firm takes the remaining share of the surplus. Nash bargaining between workers and firms gives the following flow wage:

$$w(x, y, \ell) = (1 - \beta)bx + \beta xy + (1 - \beta)\beta \lambda(\ell)S(x, y(\ell), \ell) - \beta(1 - \tilde{\beta})q(\ell)S(x(\ell), y, \ell),$$

(2)

where $1 - \tilde{\beta} = \frac{\rho}{\rho + \delta_v}(1 - \beta)$. First, wages increase in the output of a given match, $xy$, and the unemployment benefit, $bx$. In addition, wages depend on location $\ell$, which determines the threat points in the bargaining game: If the job arrival rate $\lambda(\ell)$ or the productivity of firms in the local labor market $y(\ell)$ is higher, unemployed workers’ values from search, captured by $\beta \lambda(\ell)S(x, y(\ell), \ell)$, is higher, which leads to an increase in wages. In contrast, if the vacancy contact rate $q(\ell)$ or the productivity of workers

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\(^8\) Since I focus on the class of pure assignments, there are only firms of productivity $y(\ell)$ in labor market $\ell$. Thus, workers always accept job offers in equilibrium.
in the local labor market \(x(\ell)\) is higher, the value of vacancies, captured by \((1 - \tilde{\beta})q(\ell)S(x(\ell), y, \ell)\), is higher, which leads to a decrease in wages.

Finally, I can solve for the value of workers of productivity \(x\) when choosing location \(\ell\),

\[
\rho V^u(x, \ell) = bx + \frac{\beta \lambda(\ell)}{\bar{\rho} + \beta \lambda(\ell)}(y(\ell) - b) \left( x - \frac{(1 - \tilde{\beta})q(\ell)}{\bar{\rho} + \beta \lambda(\ell) + (1 - \beta)q(\ell)} x(\ell) \right) + \Pi - \tilde{h} r(\ell), \tag{3}
\]

where \(\bar{\rho} \equiv \rho + \delta\). I summarize the marginal return to a worker’s productivity from local labor markets as job opportunities, \(A_w\), which increase in local firm productivity \(y(\ell)\) and the job arrival rate \(\lambda(\ell)\). However, better job opportunities do not necessarily translate into higher values for workers. Firms appropriate a portion of the surplus, as represented by the term \(B_w\), which increases in the vacancy contact rate \(q(\ell)\) and local worker productivity \(x(\ell)\). The final term represents the local congestion costs associated with housing expenditure, which is higher when there is a larger measure of worker, and results in increased housing demand. Workers of productivity \(x\) choose the location that maximizes value \(V^u(x, \ell)\), and this decision defines the location-matching function of workers \(x(\ell)\).

Next, I solve for the value of firms of productivity \(y\) when operating location \(\ell\), in which they post \(\delta_v\) effective units of vacancies and pay local overhead costs \(c(\ell)\) in each point in time.

\[
\rho V^v(y, \ell) \equiv \delta_v V^v(y, \ell) - c(\ell)
\]

\[
= \frac{\delta_v}{\bar{\rho}} \frac{(1 - \tilde{\beta})q(\ell)}{y(\ell) - b} x(\ell) \left( y - b - \frac{\beta \lambda(\ell)}{\bar{\rho} + \beta \lambda(\ell) + (1 - \beta)q(\ell)} (y(\ell) - b) \right) - c(\ell). \tag{4}
\]

The value of firms has a structure similar to that of workers. I define the marginal return to firm’s productivity from local labor markets as hiring opportunities, \(A_f\), which increase in local worker productivity \(x(\ell)\) and the vacancy contact rate \(q(\ell)\). The term \(B_f\) represents the fact that firms share the surplus with workers. Firms take a smaller share of the surplus when workers have a higher value for job search due to higher \(y(\ell)\) and \(\lambda(\ell)\). Finally, firms need to pay their overhead costs \(c(\ell)\), which increase in a measure of local firms due to increased demand for business services. Firms of productivity \(y\) choose the optimal location \(\ell\) that maximizes the value \(V^v(y, \ell)\), and this choice defines the location-matching function of firms \(y(\ell)\).
**Density of workers and firms.** The location choices of workers determine population density $L(\ell)$, which represents the measure of workers per unit land in $\ell$. Similarly, the location decisions of firms determine firm density $N(\ell)$, which is the measure of firms that choose location $\ell$. The measures of workers and firms choosing locations between 0 and $\ell$ equal the measures of their types choosing these locations:

$$
\int_0^\ell L(\ell') \, d\ell' = M_w \int_{\{x(\ell'): \ell' \in [0,\ell]\}} dQ_w(x),
$$

$$
\int_0^\ell N(\ell') \, d\ell' = M_f \int_{\{y(\ell'): \ell' \in [0,\ell]\}} dQ_f(y).
$$

In particular, under my labeling of locations, the first equation simplifies to $\frac{1}{M_w} \int_0^\ell L(\ell') \, d\ell' = Q_w(x(\ell))$. Then, population density becomes

$$
L(\ell) = M_w Q'_w(x(\ell)) x'(\ell).
$$

(5)

Importantly, when housing supply is inelastic, the distribution of land equals the housing supply. Thus, the housing market clearing condition pins down $Q_w(x(\ell)) = \ell$, and population density becomes identical across $\ell$.

Local housing rents $r(\ell)$ are determined by housing market clearing, $r(\ell) = C'_r(\bar{h} L(\ell))$. Similarly, local overhead costs $c(\ell)$ are pinned down by market clearing for business services, $c(\ell) = C'_v(N(\ell))$.

**Laws of motions.** I consider the laws of motion of the measure of vacancies $V(\ell)$ and unemployment rate $u(\ell)$. A measure $N(\ell)$ of firms in location $\ell$ posts a flow $\delta_u N(\ell)$ of efficiency units of vacancies. A flow of separated matches $\delta(1 - u(\ell)) L(\ell)$ reenters the search pool. Vacancies can either be matched to unemployed workers at rate $q(\ell)$ or be destroyed at rate $\delta_u$. Unemployed workers find jobs at rate $\lambda(\ell)$, and employed workers lose their jobs at rate $\delta$. Steady-state unemployment rates and the measure of vacancies are given by

$$
u(\ell) = \frac{\delta}{\delta + \lambda(\ell)}, \quad V(\ell) = N(\ell).
$$

(6)

**Definition of steady-state equilibrium.** A pure-assignment steady-state equilibrium consists of location-matching functions $(x(\ell), y(\ell))$, population density $L(\ell)$, firm density $N(\ell)$, measure of vacancies $V(\ell)$, and...
unemployment rates \( u(\ell) \), housing rents \( r(\ell) \), overhead costs \( c(\ell) \), and wages \( w(x, y, \ell) \) such that the wage is determined by Nash bargaining; markets for housing and business services clear; the flow-balance conditions hold; and workers and firms optimally choose locations.

3. Equilibrium Analysis

In this section, I first characterize the positive properties of the decentralized equilibrium and then analyze the efficiency properties. I close this section with a brief discussion of alternative modeling choices.

3.1 Spatial Sorting and Spatial Disparities

I first discuss the existence and several properties of the equilibrium.

Proposition 1. A pure-assignment equilibrium exists. Any pure-assignment equilibrium exhibits the following properties:

1. Positive assortative matching between workers and firms across space: Firm productivity \( y(\cdot) \) increases in \( \ell \) just like worker productivity \( x(\cdot) \).
2. When \( \delta_v \) is sufficiently large, population density \( L(\cdot) \) increases in \( \ell \).
3. When \( \delta_v \) is sufficiently large, wages \( w(x(\cdot), y(\cdot), \cdot) \) increase in \( \ell \).

Proposition 1 establishes that an equilibrium with PAM between workers and firms exists. The value of workers in (3) satisfies a single-crossing condition in worker productivity \( x \) and job opportunities \( A_w \), and firms’ value in (4) satisfies a single-crossing condition in firm productivity \( y \) and hiring opportunities \( A_f \). Because I assume that \( x(\ell) \) is increasing, job opportunities increase in \( \ell \) in equilibrium based on results on monotone comparative statics (Milgrom and Shannon, 1994). Firm productivity \( y(\ell) \) also increases if hiring opportunities increase in \( \ell \). Importantly, these patterns can be self-fulfilling because workers and firms simultaneously sort. An increasing \( x(\ell) \) (\( y(\ell) \), respectively) can account for increasing \( A_f(x(\ell), q(\ell)) \) \( (A_w(y(\ell), \lambda(\ell)), \) respectively), when differences in \( q(\ell) \) \( (\lambda(\ell), \) respectively) are relatively small. This shows that supermodularity of the output function can lead to worker-firm complementarity in the spatial sorting problem, and in turn lead to PAM between workers and firms.
The challenge of showing PAM arises from the presence of search frictions, which generates differences in contact rates, $\lambda(\ell)$ and $q(\ell)$. In principle, job opportunities can be higher in higher-$\ell$ locations even when firm productivity $y(\ell)$ is lower if job arrival rates $\lambda(\ell)$ are sufficiently high, which breaks PAM. However, the introduction of congestion forces helps to resolve this tension. Higher job arrival rates require a larger measure of firms, which increases overhead costs. At the same time, hiring opportunities should be smaller in these locations, given that they are chosen by less productive firms by monotone comparative statics. Therefore, firms would prefer to locate elsewhere, which prevents a non-PAM equilibrium.

The second property of Proposition 1 shows that there is a positive relation between the productivity of workers and firms and the population density of locations. Workers benefit from better job opportunities in higher-$\ell$ locations chosen by more productive firms. Thus, a larger number of workers are attracted to those locations. Note that the vacancy destruction rate $\delta_v$ needs to be sufficiently large for this result. If it is too low, locations with more productive firms may be less attractive to workers despite better job opportunities due to an excessively high threat point of firms, $B_w$. In this scenario, these locations could be less densely populated.

Random matching in local labor markets is crucial for the second property of Proposition 1, which ensures that workers’ value of choosing locations increases in local firm productivity, all other things being equal. Since search is random, all workers have the opportunity to be matched with more productive firms that pay higher wages, as long as they search for a job within these locations. In contrast, if firms could select the workers they hire based on workers’ productivity, as in competitive labor markets or labor markets with directed search, simply participating in a local labor market with more productive firms would not lead to an increase in wages. I present the results under these alternative labor market structures in Section 3.3 and discuss the differences.

Finally, the last part of the proposition claims that any pure-assignment equilibrium features an urban wage premium. Having characterized the sorting decisions, $x(\ell)$ and $y(\ell)$, I can examine the spatial disparity in local wages using (2):

$$w(x(\ell), y(\ell), \ell) = \left( b + \beta \frac{\bar{\rho} + \lambda(\ell)}{\bar{\rho} + \beta \lambda(\ell) + (1 - \bar{\beta})q(\ell)} (y(\ell) - b) \right) x(\ell).$$

(7)

Average wages differ across locations due to worker and firm productivity, $x(\ell)$ and $y(\ell)$, and market tightness $\theta(\ell)$. Workers and firms of higher productivity produce more output, which results in higher
average wages. Also, higher market tightness leads to higher average wages, since it increases workers’ threat points in bargaining. I show that the potential decrease in wages due to lower market tightness is smaller than the increase in wages due to higher productivity when firms’ threat point is sufficiently low, which occurs when vacancy destruction rate $\delta_v$ is sufficiently large. It is important to note that the urban wage premium arises across homogeneous locations, and purely stems from the sorting mechanism.

Combining the results in Proposition 1, I conclude that an economy with search frictions in which heterogeneous workers and firms sort across local labor markets can explain several crucial dimensions of the spatial disparities we observe in the data.

### 3.2 Efficiency Properties of Equilibrium

In this section, I characterize the properties of the optimal spatial allocation and evaluate the efficiency of the decentralized equilibrium. From now on, I assume that $\delta_v$ is sufficiently large—specifically, by sending $\frac{\rho}{\rho + \delta_v}$ to zero.\(^{10}\)

I consider the problem of a social planner who can implement transfers across workers and can collect all profits from firms, landowners, and intermediaries, but is subject to search frictions within each labor market. Since the planner is allowed to use transfers, the problem essentially boils down to maximizing the flow of consumption goods that can be distributed across workers, which is total output minus the costs associated with housing and business services. See equation (A.4) in Appendix A.3, where I present the proofs of all results in this section.

In this economy, externalities may arise due to the presence of search frictions. Search frictions generate well-studied externalities (Hosios, 1990), which is not the focus of this paper. Thus, I make the following assumption in order to focus on assessing potential externalities arising from spatial sorting.

**Assumption 1.** The matching function is Cobb-Douglas, i.e., $M(U(\ell), V(\ell)) = AV(\ell)^{\alpha}U(\ell)^{1-\alpha}$, and the Hosios condition holds, i.e., $\beta = 1 - \alpha$. Moreover, assume that the unemployment benefit is zero, $b = 0$, and consider the limit case in which discount rate $\rho$ goes to zero.

In line with the literature, I assume the Hosios condition to ensure that the two externalities arising from changes in market tightness cancel out. Higher market tightness leads to higher job arrival rates when $\delta_v$ goes to infinity. Moreover, they converge to counterparts of an economy in which firms post the total measure of $M_f$ vacancies at each point in time, and vacancies are immediately destroyed if they are not matched.

\(^{10}\) All variables and equations, such as the values of workers and firms, wages, and market tightness, converge smoothly when $\delta_v$ goes to infinity. Moreover, they converge to counterparts of an economy in which firms post the total measure of $M_f$ vacancies at each point in time, and vacancies are immediately destroyed if they are not matched.
\(\lambda(\ell)\) and lower vacancy contact rates \(q(\ell)\), which benefits workers but hurts firms. The condition ensures that these effects cancel out. Eliminating the unemployment benefit further ensures that externalities arising from the standard search frictions are canceled out. I make an additional assumption on the discount rate to eliminate any asymmetry in impatience between workers and the social planner. Workers choose locations that maximize their unemployment value in location \(\ell\). I assume that unemployed workers are infinitely patient—i.e., the discount rate goes to zero—and ensure that the social planner’s objective function is comparable to the value function of workers and firms.

I first characterize the optimal assignment and compare this with the spatial allocation obtained in the decentralized equilibrium. The following lemma demonstrates that the optimal spatial distribution features PAM between workers and firms, as in the decentralized equilibrium.

**Lemma 1.** The optimal spatial allocation exhibits PAM between workers and firms and can be represented by two strictly increasing location-matching functions, \(x^*(\ell)\) and \(y^*(\ell)\).

PAM between workers and firms across local labor markets results in higher output in the presence of complementarity. A potential complication arises from differences in market tightness across regions. For example, a planner would assign more productive firms to locations with less productive workers, when the probability of these firm’s being matched is sufficiently higher. However, I show that this scenario does not occur due to congestion forces.

Using Lemma 1, the planning problem becomes choosing increasing worker and firm assignments \((x^*(\ell), y^*(\ell))\). Even among increasing functions, the planner still needs to decide worker and firm density across locations. Local output is determined by the number of employed workers \((1 - u(\ell))L(\ell)\) and match output \(x(\ell)y(\ell)\), and two congestion costs depend on worker and firm density. The planner solves the following problem,

\[
\max_{x(\ell), y(\ell)} \int_\ell^L \left[ (1 - u(\ell))L(\ell)x(\ell)y(\ell) - C_r(\bar{h}L(\ell)) - C_v(V(\ell)) \right] d\ell
\]

s.t. \[x'(\ell) = \frac{L(\ell)}{M_wQ'_w(x(\ell))}, \quad y'(\ell) = \frac{V(\ell)}{M_fQ'_f(y(\ell))}, \quad u(\ell) = \frac{\delta}{\delta + \lambda(\ell)}, \quad \forall \ell\]

in addition to the boundary conditions on \(x(\ell)\) and \(y(\ell)\). Constraints determine how assignments

\[\text{Congestion forces in housing and business services are essential to show this result. Otherwise, for PAM to be optimal, one needs a stronger assumption on the matching function or stronger form of complementarity.}\]
determine population density, firm density, and unemployment rates as in decentralized equilibrium. See (5) and (6) for more details.

The optimal assignment is characterized by

\[
\bar{h}C_v'(\bar{h}L(\ell))L'(\ell)L(\ell) + C_v'(V(\ell))V'(\ell)V(\ell) = 0,
\]

in addition to (A.8) in Appendix A.3. First, the above condition (8) shows that the optimal assignment of workers and firms does not exhibit spatial concentration. Specifically, changes in population density \(L'(\ell)\) and changes in the measure of vacancies \(V'(\ell)\) at each location \(\ell\) have the opposite sign, i.e., \(L'(\ell)V'(\ell) \leq 0\) for all \(\ell\). When the planner makes marginal adjustments to the assignment of workers and firms between two locations, she does not make one location strictly denser than the other. If a location is more concentrated, the planner can maintain the same level of output while reducing overall congestion costs by relocating both workers and firms to less concentrated ones. The second condition (A.8) illustrates how the planner decides whether to increase \(L(\ell)\) or \(V(\ell)\). For example, the planner chooses to allocate relatively more workers in the higher \(\ell\) region—i.e., \(L'(\ell) > 0\) and \(V'(\ell) < 0\)—when heterogeneity in firm productivity is more pronounced. By concentrating highly productive firms and a large measure of relatively homogeneous workers into a single location, the planner can increase output.

Next, I evaluate the efficiency of the decentralized equilibrium. The following proposition shows that even under Assumption 1, the decentralized allocation is inefficient due to externalities arising from spatial sorting of heterogeneous workers and firms.

**Proposition 2.** Under Assumption 1, the decentralized equilibrium is inefficient. Each worker and firm chooses a higher \(\ell\) location than what is designated by the social planner, taking the location decisions of all others as given. The social planner can implement the optimal assignment by using the following spatial transfers to workers and firms that choose location \(\ell\), decreasing in \(\ell\):

\[
t_w(\ell) = t_w^0 - \int_\ell^\ell \alpha(1 - u^*(t))u^*(t) \frac{1 - \alpha(1 - u^*(t))}{x^*(t)y^*(t)} dt,
\]

\[
t_f(\ell) = t_f^0 - \int_\ell^\ell (1 - \alpha)(1 - u^*(t)) \frac{L^*(t)}{V^*(t)} x^*(t)y^*(t) dt,
\]

where \(t_w^0, t_f^0\) are constants that cause the government budget to balance, \(x^*(\ell)\) and \(y^*(\ell)\) are the optimal assignments, and \(L^*(\ell), V^*(\ell)\), and \(u^*(\ell)\) are determined under these allocations.
When workers and firms are heterogeneous, the extent of the externalities they impose on others varies. More productive workers generate larger positive externalities on firms but the same negative externalities on workers. Thus, a single condition—i.e., the Hosios condition—no longer ensures that externalities cancel out (e.g., Shimer and Smith, 2001; Albrecht, Navarro and Vroman, 2010). Bilal (2023) extends this idea to the spatial sorting model of heterogeneous firms and shows that this intuition holds in his context.

I show that externalities arise on two margins when workers and firms simultaneously sort across space. In the decentralized economy, workers and firms overvalue the benefits of choosing denser cities. When workers compare two locations, they do not take into account a potential decrease in average worker productivity if they choose a higher $\ell$ location, which in turn negatively affects firms in that local labor market. Similarly, firms do not internalize the effects of their decisions on workers in the same manner.

The negative impact of externalities resulting from search frictions on welfare are closely connected to congestion costs, which are determined by the spatial concentration of workers and firms. Workers and firms randomly match within each local labor market, with location serving as the only source of information about each other’s type. Thus, their location choices can be interpreted as a means of signaling their own quality. More productive workers and firms signal their higher productivity by choosing more expensive locations. However, the presence of these congested areas suggests inefficiencies, which goes against (8). This discussion is reminiscent of the signaling equilibrium presented in Spence (1973), where more productive workers send a costly signal to differentiate themselves from less productive ones. Local labor markets enable the assortative matching of workers and firms, but this comes at a price in the form of congestion costs.

By adjusting the spatial transfers, the planner can ensure that workers internalize the impact of their choices on firms’ values. Notably, the marginal changes in transfers, $t'_w(\ell)$ and $t'_f(\ell)$, are more pronounced when $x^*(\ell)$ and $y^*(\ell)$ are larger, which indicates greater heterogeneity. In the extreme scenario in which workers or firms are homogeneous, these terms become zero, and spatial transfers become unnecessary.
3.3 Discussion of Alternative Modeling Choices

To understand the role of random matching, I consider two alternative labor market structures: competitive markets and labor markets with directed search. I show that these two models fall short of explaining the spatial disparities observed in the data, and particularly differential population densities across regions. Moreover, the decentralized equilibrium turns out to be efficient in both cases—as opposed to the baseline as shown in Proposition 2.

**Competitive local labor markets.** In a local labor market in \( \ell \), each firm hires a worker of productivity \( x \) to maximize its profit, \( xy - w(x, \ell) \), for a given wage schedule \( w(x, \ell) \) without any frictions. Each local labor market \( \ell \) has the same environment as the seminal work by Becker (1973). The only difference is that labor markets are segmented by location. The following proposition characterizes the pure assignment equilibrium. See Appendix A.5 for the proof.

**Proposition 3.** A pure-assignment equilibrium exists and is unique. It has the following properties:

1. Positive assortative matching between workers and firms obtains across space: Firm productivity \( y(\cdot) \) increases in \( \ell \) just like worker productivity \( x(\cdot) \).
2. Population density \( L(\cdot) \) is the same in all locations.
3. Matching between workers and firms, the wage of each worker type, and the profit of each firm type are equal to those of an economy with a single, nationwide labor market.

When a labor market is competitive without any frictions, firms can selectively hire workers and pay wages that are specific to each worker type, which are equal to the marginal contribution of workers on output. In equilibrium, wages of workers only depend on their type, i.e., \( w(x, \ell) = w(x) \). Since wages are the same across locations, workers have no incentives to choose dense and expensive locations. In turn, population density is uniform across regions, which is not consistent with the data.

More importantly, the third property in Proposition 3 indicates that locations lack economic significance in this model. Intuitively, as long as workers and firms could be selectively matched with each other without any frictions, the existence of locations does not change matching outcomes between the two.
Directed search. In Appendix A.6, I also discuss an economy in which each local labor market has search frictions and workers and firms engage in competitive or directed search (e.g., Moen, 1997). In each labor market, firms post a worker-type-specific wage, and workers optimally queue for a firm. These decisions determine both wages and the probability of matching. Specifically, I extend Eeckhout and Kircher (2010), who study directed search under two-sided heterogeneity. I incorporate the pre-stage in which workers and firms first make location choices. Next, in each location, workers and firms competitively search among those who chose the same location.

Focusing on the pure-assignment equilibrium, I show that when complementarity is strong enough, PAM between workers and firms arises. However, the equilibrium does not exhibit spatial concentration: Population density and firm density move in the opposite direction. Thus, when population density increases in $\ell$, the local unemployment rate increases in $\ell$, which is inconsistent with the data, as illustrated in Figure A.3. Therefore, this market structure also falls short in explaining empirical observations.

I further show that the decentralized equilibrium is efficient. With directed search, firms would not choose less productive workers unless their value is matched to that obtained when choosing more productive workers in local markets. Thus, less productive workers internalize their own negative impact on local firms. This differs from the baseline economy with random matching, in which workers gain a share of the increased surplus when matched with more productive firms. This finding aligns with the findings that directed search usually leads to the efficient allocation. See Proposition A.1 for the formal result.

4. Empirical Evidence of Two-Sided Sorting

At the core of my model is the two-sided sorting mechanism. Proposition 2 shows that the existence of two-sided sorting has important normative implications. Therefore, before I quantify the implications of the model, I provide direct empirical evidence of two-sided sorting. In particular, I test whether the sorting of workers leads to the sorting of firms.

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12 I consider a more general production function in this case because PAM arises if complementarity in the output function is larger than the elasticity of the matching function, as in Eeckhout and Kircher (2010).
Data. In this section, I use German administrative microdata. An empirical analysis in this section requires a matched employer-employee dataset, although it is not necessary for estimation in the next section. I use worker-level panel data from linked employer-employee data in Germany (LIAB) from the Institute for Employment Research (IAB) in Germany, which is generated by linking an annual establishment survey from IAB Establishment Panel and individual employment information from the Integrated Employment Biographies (IEB). The data provide identification numbers of establishments. Since the model does not distinguish jobs, establishments, or firms, I use these terms interchangeably in this section. I use 257 commuting zones (CZs) to capture Germany’s local labor markets.

The variables I use most extensively are two-way fixed effects of workers and firms from AKM wage regression; two-way fixed effects are widely used in the literature since Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis (1999) to understand the dispersion of wages. I rely on estimates provided by the Research Data Centre (FDZ) of the German Federal Employment Agency. These estimates are based on the IAB Employment History File (BEH), which represents the universe of workers subject to social security contributions. For example, the numbers of estimated worker and firm fixed effects over the years 2010–2017 are more than 30 million and 2 million, respectively. Fixed effects are provided for different periods and each period is about 7 years. I focus on estimates from 2003-2010 and 2010-2017 for the main analysis.

Measuring productivity. I estimate the local productivity of workers and firms by combining the model and a standard two-way fixed-effects wage regression. Measuring productivity is empirically challenging, because observable statistics such as wages depend on a variety of factors. My contribution is to map standard two-way fixed effects onto the wage components of my two-sided sorting model and show how worker and firm productivity can be recovered. In Appendix B, to justify using two-way fixed effects in my context, I present an extended model that incorporates migration frictions. This model exhibits positive cross-regional worker flows, which are necessary to identify the differences in worker and firm productivity across locations. Importantly, the wage equation remains the same as in the baseline model, and has a log-additive structure. Also, the exogenous mobility assumption is satisfied. Maintaining the assumption that the vacancy exit rate $\delta_v$ is sufficiently large, the wage

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13 They follow the estimation strategy of Card, Heining and Kline (2013). See the paper for extensive discussion of the performance of fixed effects in approximating the wage in Germany.

14 Exogenous mobility is guaranteed by a set of assumption that include random matching, exogenous separation, and the employment status of migrants.
equation (2) for a worker of productivity $x$ hired by a firm of productivity $y$ in market $\ell$ simplifies to

$$\log w(x, y, \ell) = \log \left( b + (1 - \beta) \frac{\beta \lambda(\ell)}{\hat{\rho} + \beta \lambda(\ell)} (y(\ell) - b) + \beta (y - b) \right) x, \quad \text{(9)}$$

where $y(\ell)$ is the productivity of vacancies in the local search pool.

If the data are generated by my model, estimated worker fixed effects correctly represent their log productivity. In contrast, firm fixed effects depend not only on firm productivity but also on the continuation value of local job search or the threat point of workers in bargaining. The average estimated fixed effect of newly matched jobs in location $\ell$ is\(^{15}\)

$$\log \hat{y}(\ell) = \log \left( b + \beta \frac{\hat{\rho} + \lambda(\ell)}{\hat{\rho} + \beta \lambda(\ell)} (y(\ell) - b) \right), \quad \text{(10)}$$

where I simplify the term in parentheses in (9) by imposing a pure assignment under which the productivity of new jobs $y$ is equal to $y(\ell)$.\(^{16}\) Using (10), I can recover the productivity of firms $y(\ell)$ from estimated firm fixed effects $\hat{y}(\ell)$ and the local job finding rate $\lambda(\ell)$. In Appendix B.2, I explain how this can be achieved without estimating the full model.

**Causal evidence of the two-sided sorting mechanism.** To provide direct evidence of sorting, I examine whether changes in worker sorting lead to changes in firm sorting. From the value of firms in (4), an increase in local worker productivity $x(\ell)$ results in more productive firms choosing the same location, controlling for changes in the vacancy contact rate $q(\ell)$. This motivates the following time-differenced regression:\(^{17}\)

$$\Delta \log y(\ell) = \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 \Delta \log x(\ell) + \gamma_2 \Delta \log \lambda(\ell) + u(\ell), \quad \text{(11)}$$

where $\Delta$ denotes the change in the value of a variable between the first period $t = 1$ (2003-2009) and the second period $t = 2$ (2010-2016). This choice is motivated by the fact that the FDZ estimated fixed

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\(^{15}\) Firms rarely move, and it is well acknowledged in the literature that identifying firm productivity separate from other factors is extremely difficult (e.g., Combes, Duranton and Gobillon, 2008). A few studies discuss strategies to identify firm productivity (e.g., Gaubert, 2018; Bilal, 2023; Lindenlaub, Oh and Peters, 2023). However, each strategy depends on a set of assumptions that is specific to its own context.

\(^{16}\) Two-way fixed effects can identify only the relative productivity gap among workers and among firms. I normalize the average level of $\log \hat{x}$, $\log \hat{y}$ to 0. This is without loss of generality because the model is independent of the scale.

\(^{17}\) By focusing on time differences, I cancel out time-invariant regional heterogeneity, which is not the focus of this paper. Moreover, it allows me to exploit migration instruments.
effects separately for 2003-2010 and 2010-2017.\footnote{Focusing on changes in firm productivity, as opposed to wages, provides more transparent evidence on two-sided sorting. Because changes in wages are affected by firms, workers, and local labor market conditions, they do not necessarily indicate changes in firm productivity due to two-sided sorting. They can also arise from changes in worker productivity due to agglomeration forces (e.g., knowledge spillovers) or any changes in workers’ outside option values which increase wages.} Instead of changes in $q(\ell)$, I control for changes in the job finding rate, which are inversely related to changes in $q(\ell)$ and observable in the data.\footnote{Thus, changes in the job finding rate have two roles. They control for the impact of job finding rates on estimated firm fixed effects as well as changes in hiring opportunities $A_f$ of firms.}

One concern is that changes in location-specific factors—such as TFP, amenities, or infrastructure—may causally affect the location decisions of both workers and firms. For example, an increase in local TFP may attract both more productive workers and firms, if both worker and firm productivity are complementary to local TFP. Moreover, the two-way fixed effects estimation cannot separately identify the contribution of firms from that of location because establishments do not change location in the data. Therefore, location-specific factors that contribute to production contaminate firm fixed effects, which introduces an upward bias in the estimate of firm productivity. Thus, if these changes attract more productive workers, they may bias the coefficient upward even if they are independent of firm sorting.

To address these concerns, I attempt to identify exogenous changes in worker productivity caused by shocks to other locations. Specifically, I instrument changes in the productivity of all workers in each location caused by changes in internal migrants’ productivity that are induced by shocks to the origin locations of those migrants. Migrants account for about 30% of the local search pool in my sample period—a sizable share—and thus their productivity directly affects the local average of all workers.\footnote{Although the overall migration rate is limited, I find that the importance of migrants is larger among unemployed workers. In my data, I only observe the CZ of establishments (i.e., firms), and thus I define the CZ of migrants based on their employment locations. For the period of unemployment, I assign CZ based on their next job. This is consistent with the timing of the model, which assumes that workers first choose a location and then search for a job.} Moreover, changes in the productivity of migrants indirectly also impact that of non-migrants. For example, an increase in migrant productivity may raise housing rents, which will push out less productive non-migrants who cannot afford those higher costs.

To identify plausibly exogenous changes in migrant productivity, I use predicted changes that arise from shocks to their origin locations instead of those to location $\ell$. First, I compute predicted inflows from each origin $\ell'$ to $\ell$. Specifically, I use migration flows in $t = 0$ (1991-2002) to estimate the probability that migrants from origin location $\ell'$ move to location $\ell$, $m_0(\ell' \rightarrow \ell|\ell')$. I then multiply this probability by the total number of out-migrants from each origin location $\ell'$ to any locations except $\ell$ in
Dividing this predicted flow $m_0(\ell' \rightarrow \ell|\ell)O_{\ell',-\ell,t}$ by the total predicted flows into $\ell$—i.e., the sum of these flows from all origin locations—I obtain the predicted share of migrants entering $\ell$ from each $\ell'$, $\hat{s}_t(\ell'|\ell)$. Second, I use the productivity of all migrants leaving $\ell'$ but choosing elsewhere, $\hat{x}_t(\ell',-\ell)$, instead of the productivity of migrants arriving at $\ell$. Combining shares $\hat{s}_t(\ell'|\ell)$ and productivity $\hat{x}_t(\ell',-\ell)$, I predict the productivity of migrants arriving in $\ell$ by

$$\log x_{m, IV}^{m}(\ell) = \sum_{\ell' \neq \ell} \hat{s}_t(\ell'|\ell) \log \hat{x}_t(\ell',-\ell) \quad \text{where} \quad \hat{s}_t(\ell'|\ell) = \frac{m_0(\ell' \rightarrow \ell|\ell)O_{\ell',-\ell,t}}{\sum_{k \neq \ell} m_0(k \rightarrow \ell|k)O_{k,-\ell,t}}. \quad (12)$$

Finally, I obtain the instrument for $\Delta \log x(\ell)$ by taking the time differences of these values. When a significant fraction of the variation in migrant productivity arises from shocks to origin locations, the instrument can predict changes in the productivity of all workers.

The identification assumption is that shocks to origin locations are uncorrelated with shocks to a specific destination. My instrument exploits two types of variations. First, variation in the magnitude of push shocks among origin locations leads to changes in $\hat{s}(\ell'|\ell)$. For example, a positive shock to origin location $\ell'$ decreases its out-migration. If origin $\ell'$ has lower average productivity compared with other origin locations of $\ell$, the composition of migrants arriving at $\ell$ improves, which increases worker productivity in $\ell$. Next, changes in $\hat{x}(\ell',-\ell)$ arise from changes in the productivity of workers in origin location $\ell'$, and the impact is larger when the origin $\ell'$ historically sent a large number of migrants to $\ell$.

By focusing on migrants moving to other locations $-\ell$, I exclude influences attributable to pull factors of $\ell$. This approach could be problematic if the historical network is influenced by factors that creates correlated regional shocks, such as similar industry composition or geographic proximity. To address this concern, I further control for industry or exclude origin location $\ell'$ within a 100 km radius in my robustness checks.

Table 1 shows the estimation results. In all specifications, I include the firm productivity and unemployment rates of location $\ell$ in $t = 1$ as controls. The former controls for a potential time trend in productivity due to regional convergence. The latter controls for the potential impact of the German Hartz reform, a major unemployment insurance reform in the mid-2000s. This reform led to a substantial decline in regional unemployment rates, especially in regions with initially high unemployment rates.

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21 This approach is similar to the strategy used to study the impact of international immigrants (e.g., Burchardi, Chaney and Hassan, 2019; Altonji and Card, 1991) or internal migrants (e.g., Howard, 2020; Boustan, Fishback and Kantor, 2010). However, compared with the literature that mostly focuses on changes in the number of migrants, I focus on changes in their productivity.
Table 1: Changes in Local Firm Productivity

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<td>1.080</td>
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2SLS First-stage Estimates

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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.184)</td>
<td>(0.181)</td>
<td>(0.342)</td>
<td>(0.172)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: \(N = 257\). Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. Each observation is weighted by the number of employees. The dependent variable is the change in firm productivity of new jobs. In the first-stage regression, I regress the change in worker productivity on its instrument and the controls I include in the second stage.

Column (1) documents the result of ordinary least squares estimation. An increase in worker productivity is associated with an increase in firm productivity in the same region. However, this result is subject to endogeneity concerns.

In Column (2), I report the results of the instrumental variable estimation, which helps fill this gap. In the bottom panel, I report first-stage regression results, in which I regress changes in worker productivity \(\Delta \log x(\ell)\) on the instrument \(\Delta \log x^{\text{m,IV}}(\ell)\) and the same controls as in the second-stage. I find a statistically significant positive coefficient. The IV regression coefficient is statistically significant and economically meaningful: An exogenous 10\% increase in the productivity of local workers in the search pool leads to an 11.3\% increase in firm productivity of new jobs in the same location.\(^{22}\) To test robustness, I construct a dependent variable by first residualizing firm productivity against 1-digit industry fixed effects in Column (3) and drop all flows that are to or from locations within 100 km in Column (4). The coefficients of interest do not change much.

Even if instrumented changes in worker productivity are exogenous, it may be the case that agglomeration forces, in addition to firm sorting, are behind the positive coefficients. An increase in worker productivity may endogenously increase the productivity of all matched jobs in a location (e.g., Diamond, 2016; Rossi-Hansberg, Sarte and Schwartzman, 2019). In such a case, similar to local TFP, this would contaminate estimates of firm fixed effects and create positive measurement errors in firm

\(^{22}\) This coefficient is larger than that of OLS, which indicates that the attenuation bias due to measurement errors appears to be larger than the upward bias, for example, due to changes in local TFP.
productivity. To focus on the effects of firm sorting, I also control for changes in the firm fixed effects of existing jobs that are created in the first period, $\Delta \log \hat{y}^{\text{old}}$, which also benefit from agglomeration forces or any other form of region-level spillovers. Column (5) shows the result of my preferred specification with full controls. The coefficient of 1.045 implies that a 1 standard deviation increase in worker productivity in a location induces a 0.51 standard deviation increase in firm productivity in the same location.

I further support these results with two additional results. First, I use a reduced-form approach and use changes in estimated firm fixed effects $\Delta \log \hat{y}(\ell)$ as a dependent variable. Overall results remain almost the same: A 1 standard deviation increase in the worker productivity of a local labor market induces a 0.6 standard deviation increase in the productivity of firms choosing that location. Second, I also regress changes in the firm fixed effects of existing jobs, $\Delta \log \hat{y}^{\text{old}}(\ell)$, as a placebo test. In contrast to Table 1, the coefficients are insignificant and nearly zero, which implies that most changes in the productivity of new jobs arise from changes in firm sorting rather than changes in regional factors. All results are summarized in Appendix B.3.

In summary, this analysis shows that worker sorting has a significant impact on firm sorting. This finding supports the two-sided sorting mechanism as an important driver of spatial disparities. This evidence supports the use of my model for policy evaluation in the next section.

5. Quantitative Analysis

I now examine the quantitative implications of the model. In this section, I calibrate the model using cross-sectional data on U.S. MSAs for three reasons. First, the U.S. features more pronounced spatial disparities than any other country; extensive studies document spatial inequality in the U.S. (e.g., Diamond and Moretti, 2021; Card, Rothstein and Yi, 2023). Second, the U.S. has adopted various

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23 Note that concerns arise only when agglomeration forces affect production that occurs in a given location. In contrast, when they increase the productivity of workers—e.g., knowledge spillovers that increase human capital—an increase in productivity will be attributed to worker productivity.

24 Specifically, I compute changes in the firm fixed effects of each job using fixed-effects estimates that are separately provided for two periods. I only include jobs in firms that survived in the second period and have firm fixed effects for both periods. I use the firm fixed effects of existing jobs due to the potential for a spurious negative correlation between their recovered productivity and that of new jobs. See Appendix B.3 for more discussion and the results.
forms of spatial policies, yet their welfare implications are unclear. Third, my estimation strategy requires only regional data, which are readily available in many countries.

### 5.1 Quantitative Model

**Setting.** To bring the model to the data, I make the following changes to render it suitable for quantitative work. First, I generalize preferences to a Stone-Geary utility and assume that workers’ flow utility is given by $g^{1-\omega}(h - \bar{h})^\omega$, where $g$ denotes tradable goods and $h$ denotes housing consumption. This change helps to accurately capture the quantitative impact of congestion costs from higher housing rents, which is a key component in workers’ location decisions. Second, I assume free entry of firms. Entrants pay an entry cost $c_e$, enter the economy, and draw productivity $y \sim Q_f$. The aggregate measure of firms $M_f$ is endogenously determined such that the expected net profit is zero. This allows me to further understand the impact of adjustments on the extensive margin in counterfactual exercises.

I introduce two policies that I evaluate in Section 6. The first is the federal income tax. Workers pay a fraction $\tau_w(\ell)$ of their labor income, either wages $w(x, y, \ell)$ or unemployment benefit $b x$. This tax is progressive—i.e., the tax rate increases in workers’ income. To approximate this feature, I assume that the tax rate is specific to each region. Tax revenues are redistributed to all workers as a lump sum. Second, I introduce local housing regulations. In particular, I assume that the local government taxes housing production at rate $\tau_h(H, \ell)$, where $H$ is the total housing supply in location $\ell$. For example, if the local government imposes a housing tax that increases in supply $H$, the housing supply elasticity will decline. I assume that local governments redistribute tax revenues to local workers as a lump sum.

With these changes, the value of unemployed workers becomes

$$\rho V^u(x, \ell) = r(\ell)^{-\omega}((1 - \tau_w(\ell))(b + A_w(y(\ell), \lambda(\ell)))x - \bar{h}r(\ell) + \Pi + T_r(\ell)), \quad (13)$$

where $\Pi$ is the sum of lump-sum redistributions of income taxes, landowners’ profits $\Pi_r$, and intermediaries’ profits $\Pi_c$, net of taxes for unemployment benefits. Workers also receive housing tax revenues

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25 The U.S. not only adopts policies that are designed to address spatial concerns such as place-based policies (e.g., Busso, Gregory and Kline, 2013; Kline and Moretti, 2014), but also policies that indirectly affect the location choices of workers and firms such as local regulations (e.g., Hsieh and Moretti, 2019) and local taxes (e.g., Fajgelbaum et al., 2019).

26 With this generalized utility, I can easily modify the equilibrium, except for wage bargaining between workers and firms. In Appendix C.2, I show that the bargaining solution remains almost the same, and the tractability of the model is preserved.

27 A more direct way is to assume that the tax rate depends on workers’ income. However, in this case, the wage bargaining problem cannot be solved by Nash bargaining. By assuming a location-specific tax rate, I can maintain tractability.
that are redistributed locally. In addition, the housing market clearing condition in (A.15) takes into account that housing demand increases in both population density and after-tax average income—and given the demand, housing rents are higher when housing regulations are stricter.

**Functional forms.** I continue to assume that matches are produced by a Cobb-Douglas matching function with the matching efficiency $A$ and a constant matching elasticity $\alpha$, as in Assumption 1. I use a housing production cost function with constant elasticity, which leads to the housing supply function $H(\ell) = H_w r(\ell)^{\eta_w}$. This functional form is commonly used in the literature, and can be micro-founded by a housing production function that combines land and capital. Similarly, I use the same functional form for the business services supply function with parameters $(H_f, \eta_f)$. Note that all functions are common across regions, so I do not assume any regional ex ante heterogeneity except for two policies: income taxes and housing regulations.

I assume that the tax rate on housing production is $1 + \tau_h(H, \ell) = (H/T)^{t_h(\ell)}$, where $t_h(\ell)$ captures the stringency of local housing regulations. In Appendix C.2, I show that the inverse of the housing supply elasticity becomes $1/\eta_w + t_h(\ell)$, and thus more stringent regulations result in lower housing supply elasticity.

**5.2 Data**

My primary data source is the American Community Survey (ACS) 2017 from IPUMS (Ruggles et al., 2023). I compute the average annual earnings, unemployment rate, housing rents, and housing spending share for each MSA. Before computing local averages, I residualize wages with demographics and 1-digit industry, unemployment status with demographics, and housing rents with characteristics of buildings.

I complement this dataset with a several additional sources. I use the Current Population Survey (CPS) from IPUMS (Flood et al., 2022) to compute the job separation rate and federal income taxes. Next, I borrow estimates on differential housing supply elasticities across MSAs from Saiz (2010). In particular, he estimates how these elasticities are affected by the Whorton Residential Urban Land Regulation Index (WRI), which is a measure of housing regulation developed by Gyourko, Saiz and Summers (2008). Finally, I obtain population density from the U.S. Census and local GDP per capita.
from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) and average spending shares on housing from the Consumer Expenditure Survey (2017). See Appendix C.1 for more details.

5.3 Estimation

First, I order MSAs by population density, which is observable and increasing in $\ell$. For computation purposes, I group MSAs into 20 bins $\{\ell_1, \ldots, \ell_{20}\}$, with each bin containing the same proportion of the total population. Each bin $\ell_i$ corresponds to an interval of locations in the model, with its measure proportional to the inverse of the population in that bin. For each bin, I compute the averages of population density $L(\ell)$, wage $w(\ell)$, unemployment rate $u(\ell)$, housing rent $r(\ell)$, and housing spending share by weighting each MSA with its population. Finally, I compute the equilibrium at monthly frequency.

I will now discuss estimation of the model. Although formal identification is not feasible, I will explain how each variable can be pinned down by certain moments, using heuristic arguments. I first discuss parameters that are externally set or calibrated directly from the data, which are summarized in the top panel of Table 2. Next, I proceed with the parameters, listed in the bottom panel, that are internally calibrated.

**Externally set or calibrated parameters.** I set the discount rate $\rho = 0.004$, which implies an annual real interest rate of 5%. I set the matching elasticity to $\alpha = 0.5$ based on standard values in the literature. The separation rate $\delta = 0.028$ is set to the average monthly transition probability from employment into unemployment. I compute the number of workers who report being unemployed for 5 weeks or less divided by employment 1 month before to avoid the time aggregation issue (Shimer, 2012). Given $\alpha$ and $\delta$, using the flow-balance condition in (6), I can compute the measure of vacancies $V(\ell)$. As the normalization, I set $A$ to match the ratio of the total number of vacancies over the total number of unemployed workers in the U.S. I assume the destruction rate of a vacancy, $\delta_v$, is sufficiently large.

---

28 As locations are ex ante homogeneous, choosing endogenous outcomes to order regions is unavoidable. In principle, I can use any variable that has a monotonic relation with $x(\ell)$—my criterion for ordering $\ell$—such as the average wage or GDP per capita.

29 Alternatively, I could group MSAs in such a way that each bin contains the same number of MSAs. I prefer this approach because it avoids over-assignment of bins to less densely populated MSAs, so that the number of workers assigned to each bin varies significantly.
Table 2: Parameter Values

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Target</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>δ</td>
<td>separation rate</td>
<td>EU transition rate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ρ</td>
<td>discount rate</td>
<td>interest rate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>α</td>
<td>matching elasticity</td>
<td>literature</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>matching efficiency</td>
<td>market tightness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\bar{h}, \omega)</td>
<td>housing demand</td>
<td>spending shares on housing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\eta_w)</td>
<td>housing supply</td>
<td>housing rents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b</td>
<td>unemployment benefit</td>
<td>replacement rate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\beta)</td>
<td>worker’s bargaining power</td>
<td>labor share</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(H_f, \eta_f)</td>
<td>business services supply</td>
<td>wages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T</td>
<td>housing tax</td>
<td>housing rents</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: The top panel shows parameters that are externally calibrated and the bottom panel shows parameters that are internally calibrated.

In practice, I set \(\frac{\rho}{\rho + \delta_v} = 0\), effectively assuming that firm’s threat point is zero.\(^{30}\) Finally, I find the bargaining power of workers \(\beta\) that matches the labor share.

**Estimation strategy.** I am now left with a set of parameters \(\{\bar{h}, \omega, \eta_w, b, \beta, H_f, \eta_f, H_w, c_e\}\) and the productivity of workers and firms across regions \(\{x(\ell), y(\ell)\}_\ell\) to be estimated internally. I normalize the minimum values of worker productivity \(x(\ell)\), firm productivity \(y(\ell)\), and housing rents \(r(\ell)\), which together determine the scale of an economy. Specifically, I set \(y(\ell)\) and \(r(\ell)\) to 1, and choose \(x(\ell)\) to match the level of wages of the lowest bin, \(w(\ell)\). The housing market clearing condition of region \(\ell\) pins down \(H_w\). Entry cost \(c_e\) will be set to an average expected profit after estimation. This leaves me with 7 structural parameters, \(\{\bar{h}, \omega, \eta_w, b, \beta, H_f, \eta_f\}\), and productivities \(\{x(\ell), y(\ell)\}\).

I approach these two groups of parameters using different strategies. Structural parameters that apply to the entire economy can be calibrated by targeting standard moments. The main challenge is separately estimating the productivity of workers and firms across regions. To tackle this, I rely on equilibrium conditions as well as observed regional variables, which allows me to recover productivities \(\{x(\ell), y(\ell)\}\) during the estimation process.

\(^{30}\) This choice has three advantages. First, as stated in Proposition 1, \(\delta_v\) needs to be sufficiently large to explain the urban wage premium. Second, it decreases the continuation value of vacancies to zero, comparable to the free entry assumption in Pissarides (2000) or no capacity constraint in Postel-Vinay and Lindenlaub (2023), which is widely used in the search literature mainly for tractability. This tractability is useful in Section 3.2 and Section 4. Lastly, separately identifying \(\delta_v\) and \(\beta\) is challenging.
Specifically, I compute productivity using equilibrium conditions by targeting population density and unemployment rates \( \{L(\ell), u(\ell)\} \) across all bins for given structural parameters.\(^{31}\) First, using (6), I compute the measure of vacancies \( \{V(\ell)\} \), job finding rates \( \{\lambda(\ell)\} \), and vacancy contact rates \( \{q(\ell)\} \). Given these variables and other parameters, I find \( \{x(\ell), y(\ell)\} \) that satisfy first-order conditions of the location decisions of workers and firms, \( V^u_u(x(\ell), \ell) = 0 \) and \( V^v_v(y(\ell), \ell) = 0 \), and housing market clearing.

I estimate structural parameters by minimizing the distance between the vector of moments I target \( \hat{m} \) and the model counterpart \( m(\Theta) \),

\[
(\hat{m} - m(\Theta))^\prime \mathcal{W} (\hat{m} - m(\Theta)), \quad \text{where } \Theta = \{\bar{h}, \omega, \eta_w, b, \beta, H_f, \eta_f\} \cup \{L(\ell), u(\ell)\}.
\]

The matrix \( \mathcal{W} \) is a diagonal matrix, containing the reciprocals of the squared data moments.\(^{32}\) I now discuss the relationship between parameters and specific moments. Table 2 summarizes parameters along with the most relevant targeted moments.

**Housing market.** Preferences for housing, \( \bar{h} \) and \( \omega \), can be obtained from the aggregate average housing spending share and its variation across regions. The housing spending of a worker with income \( I \) equals \( (1 - \omega)r(\ell)\bar{h} + \omega I \). The local housing spending share increases faster in \( \ell \) if the parameter \( \bar{h} \) is larger, since housing rents rise in \( \ell \) more rapidly than income in the data. In contrast, the parameter \( \omega \) uniformly increases the spending shares of all regions. I target average spending shares on housing in the U.S. and the ratio of spending shares between the first and last quartile to pin down \( (\bar{h}, \omega) \).

Next, the housing supply elasticity, \( \eta_w \), and the housing tax parameter, \( T \), are informed by rents, housing demand, and housing regulations across locations. Equation (A.14) reveals that a faster increase in housing rents due to higher housing demand leads to a smaller \( \eta_w \), and a larger effect of housing regulations on housing rents indicates a smaller \( T \). I target the rent ratio between the first quartile and three other quartiles to jointly determine \( (\eta_w, T) \).

---

\(^{31}\) An alternative, more conventional way is to parameterize the distribution of workers and firms, \( Q_w \) and \( Q_f \), and then search over its parameters. My approach has three advantages. First, it solves potential problems of multiple equilibria because I start directly from empirical moments. Second, I do not need to make parametric assumptions on the productivity distribution. I can compute implied \( Q_w \) and \( Q_f \) ex post, combining \( \{x(\ell), y(\ell)\} \) and \( \{L(\ell), V(\ell)\} \). Lastly, it is computationally much faster.

\(^{32}\) Because all bins of \( \{L(\ell), u(\ell)\} \) are included in \( \hat{m} \), I divide the corresponding diagonal elements of \( \mathcal{W} \) by the total number of bins to avoid overemphasizing these moments.
Labor market. I pin down the unemployment benefit parameter, $b$, by targeting the average replacement rate of 50% (Landais, Michaillat and Saez, 2018), which is the ratio between the income of unemployed workers $b\mathbb{E}[x]$ and the average wage in my model. Next, I can obtain the bargaining power of workers, $\beta$, from the labor share.

Productivity. Differences in wages arise from dispersion in the productivity of both workers and firms, and separating the contribution of the two is the key step in the identification. I can identify the contribution of workers based on a revealed preference argument—i.e., the sorting condition of workers. Specifically, the value of workers in (3) describes the trade-off between higher income and increased housing rents.

For example, consider two locations, $\ell' < \ell''$, where $\ell'' - \ell'$ is sufficiently small. Workers in $\ell'$ are almost indifferent regarding moving to $\ell''$. This implies that if these workers choose $\ell''$, they will earn higher nominal wages to offset higher housing rents. The gap between these hypothetical wages, $w(x(\ell'), y(\ell''), \ell'')$, and the observed wages of workers in $\ell''$, $w(x(\ell''), y(\ell''), \ell'')$, reflects the difference in worker productivity between the two locations. When the difference in housing rents between locations is smaller, $w(x(\ell'), y(\ell''), \ell'')$ will be lower, which implies that workers in $\ell''$ are much more productive. Thus, given the observed wage differences between two locations, the contribution of workers will be larger, while that of firms will be relatively smaller. This identification strategy aligns with Glaeser and Maré’s claim (2001) that higher wages in large cities reflect either higher ability or higher prices. When housing rents are comparable across regions, this suggests that the higher ability of workers primarily accounts for higher wages, with firms playing a relatively limited role.

Business services market. I obtain business services supply function parameters, $(H_f, \eta_f)$, using the sorting conditions of firms. The value of firms in (4) reveals how firms balance gains from the labor market, such as higher worker productivity, with increased overhead costs. Given worker and firm productivity, as discussed above, I can back out overhead costs that satisfy the sorting conditions of firms, which then pin down $(H_f, \eta_f)$. A large increase in worker productivity leads to a significant increase in implied overhead costs, which indicates a higher $H_f$. If this increase is particularly pronounced in regions in which a measure of vacancy computed from the model is significant, implied housing supply elasticity $\eta_f$ will be smaller.
5.4 Estimation Results

The right column of Table 2 summarizes the estimation results. The estimated housing subsistence level $\bar{h}$ is large, which indicates that the non-homotheticity of housing preferences is substantial. The estimated housing elasticity $\eta_{hw}$ is 11.31, which is relatively larger than estimates in the literature (e.g., Saiz, 2010; Green, Malpezzi and Mayo, 2005). However, the average housing elasticity after accounting for regulation is 7.95, which is much smaller. The bargaining power of workers $\beta$ is estimated to be 0.04. This estimate is comparable to that of Bilal (2023), who assumes a similar setup of wage determination.

In the left panel of Figure 3, I plot the estimated productivity of workers and firms across regions. The heterogeneity of both workers and firms is substantial, with more prominent productivity dispersion observed among workers. To illustrate, workers and firms in the top 10% of cities are 24.4% and 20.4% more productive than those in the bottom 10%, respectively.

How does this productivity heterogeneity translate into spatial wage inequality? In the right panel of Figure 3, I break down the urban wage premium—i.e., the wage increase associated with population density—into three components using (7). Each line represents the cross-sectional wage resulting from differences in worker productivity $x(\ell)$, firm productivity $y(\ell)$, and market tightness $\theta(\ell)$, while keeping all other variables at their average values. Workers and firms account for about 60.4% and 38.8% of the total urban wage premium, respectively. In contrast, the role of market tightness is limited.

In Table 3, I report the fit of 10 targeted moments, excluding $\{L(\ell), u(\ell)\}$, whose fit is documented in Figure A.3. Overall, the model performs well in matching the targeted moments. Note that the model is stylized and well suited for matching systematic patterns. However, matching each specific moment
Table 3: Model Fit

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quartile</th>
<th>Wage 2</th>
<th>Wage 3</th>
<th>Wage 4</th>
<th>Housing Share mean</th>
<th>Replac. rate 4(^{th} - 1^{st})</th>
<th>Labor share</th>
<th>Rent 2</th>
<th>Rent 3</th>
<th>Rent 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Target $\hat{m}$</td>
<td>0.091</td>
<td>0.229</td>
<td>0.351</td>
<td>0.330</td>
<td>0.044</td>
<td>0.500</td>
<td>0.600</td>
<td>0.079</td>
<td>0.343</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model $m(\Theta)$</td>
<td>0.092</td>
<td>0.226</td>
<td>0.353</td>
<td>0.320</td>
<td>0.046</td>
<td>0.500</td>
<td>0.604</td>
<td>0.147</td>
<td>0.353</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: For wages and rents, I first compute the average of four quartile groups. Then, I target the average of the $i$-th quartile/the average of the first quartile $- 1$, where $i = 2, 3, 4$. Housing share difference is the difference between the average housing spending share between the first and last quartile groups.

Across $\ell$ is difficult, especially when the moments are noisy. In the right panel of Figure A.3, the model aligns with the observed pattern of flat unemployment rates across $\ell$, but it does not accurately fit the unemployment rates for each specific $\ell$. In Figure 4, I further compare moments from the data and model for log wages, housing rents, and rent spending share across $\ell$. As expected from Table 3, the model replicates the overall patterns of these moments well.\(^{33}\)

Thus, I conclude that despite its simplicity, the model can successfully account for the spatial disparities observed in the data. Two-sided sorting alone suffices, not only theoretically but also quantitatively, without region-specific factors—such as local TFP and amenities—or agglomeration forces.

**Overidentification.** Using the estimated model, I regress log wages and its two components, log $x(\ell)$ and log $w(\ell)/x(\ell)$, on log population density. I estimate coefficients 0.13, 0.075, and 0.05, respectively. To validate the model, I compare these results to those of Card, Rothstein and Yi (2023), who run a two-way fixed-effects log wage regression of workers and CZ, using matched employer-employee data in U.S. As explained in Section 4, estimated worker fixed effects identify the productivity of workers. Thus, I can map their person effects and CZ place effects to $x(\ell)$ and $w(\ell)/x(\ell)$ in my model, respectively. Card, Rothstein and Yi run a similar regression and estimate coefficients of 0.075, 0.04, and 0.034, as reported in Table 3 in their paper. As in my results, the two components of wages are both quantitatively important and the coefficient of worker productivity is larger.\(^{34}\)

\(^{33}\) The model is highly stylized, and thus is suitable for explaining the overall pattern. It is difficult, however, to replicate irregular variation if they are too volatile in $\ell$. In addition, among targeted moments, the relative rent of the second quartile from the model of 0.147 exceeds the target of 0.079. In the data, both density and average wages increase substantially from the first to the second quartile, while rents remain relatively similar. Because the housing supply function is parameterized by a single elasticity parameter, matching all moments is challenging.

\(^{34}\) The importance of worker heterogeneity is larger in my estimation, which may arise from differences in the geographical units, sample years, or controls. For example, they use Commuting Zones to define locations and population to measure the concentration of workers, while I use MSA and population density.
Figure 4. Model Fit: Wage, Housing Rent, and Housing Spending Share

Notes: Data source: ACS (2017). Each dot represents 5% of the population. I compute average values for each dot by weighting each MSA with its population.

In Figure A.4, I also present a binned scatter of log GDP per capita across regions and the model counterpart. It is not surprising that the model replicates the variation in GDP per capita, since I target the cross-section of wages.

Threats to identification. My model is highly stylized and assumes that the spatial sorting of heterogeneous workers and firms alone accounts for spatial inequality. If other factors affect the value of workers or wages, they can pose a threat to my identification strategy. For example, if local TFP is higher in denser locations or agglomeration forces exist, they also contribute to spatial disparities but I will attribute them to firm heterogeneity. Similarly, if workers enjoy higher amenities in densely populated areas, all of these benefits will be attributed to firm heterogeneity.

Identifying alternative mechanisms from the two-sided sorting mechanism, however, is beyond the scope of this paper. Nonetheless, incorporating additional mechanisms in the model is straightforward. For example, in Section 6, I present an alternative model, in which each location has heterogeneous local TFP, while firms are homogeneous, and emphasize the differences in policy implications between the two models.

6. Policy Evaluation

To highlight the importance of the two-sided sorting mechanism, I now evaluate several real-world policies that affect the incentives of workers and firms to relocate across regions. The central idea behind the two-sided sorting mechanism is the fact that productivity is embodied in workers and firms.
Therefore, it is crucial that we understand how heterogeneous workers and firms jointly respond to policies and, in turn, how particular workers are matched with particular firms in producing output in the new equilibrium.

Many real-world institutions and policies influence the location decisions of workers and firms. Examples include place-based policies that provide subsidies to firms in economically disadvantaged areas, variation in local government tax systems, and discrepancies in the stringency of housing regulations. Furthermore, even when policies are uniform nationwide, they can interact with regional disparities to affect location decisions. One example is the federal income tax, which imposes higher tax rates on individuals with higher nominal incomes. In this paper, I focus on the two policies I incorporated in the model in Section 5.1. I first evaluate cuts to federal income tax rates, then briefly discuss the impact of differential housing regulations.

**Federal income tax.** In the U.S., workers in the top 10% of dense regions pay, on average, 60% higher federal taxes than workers in the bottom 10% (CPS March, 2017). This tax discrepancy can have adverse effects on employment in dense areas for two reasons. First, higher rents in dense cities partially offset the benefits of higher nominal wages, which renders taxes based on nominal income disproportionately burdensome for workers in those regions. Second, if income tax rates are progressive, they further diminish the incentives for workers to choose densely populated areas with better job prospects and higher expected wages. Albouy (2009) argues that the federal income tax reduces employment in high-wage areas and leads to inefficiencies. I revisit this issue in the context of the two-sided sorting of workers and firms.

I examine the impact of the Tax Cuts and Job Acts enacted in December 2017. Specifically, I focus on the income tax cuts introduced by the reform. Reforms include changes in tax brackets, mostly lower tax rates, and an increase in standard deductions. Figure 5 shows the shares of after-tax income of adjusted gross income before and after the reform. Workers on average pay about 11% of their income as taxes, and those in dense cities pay higher rates due to tax progressivity. After the tax cuts, the approximated after-tax income share is higher and exhibits less regional variation.

In my model, the tax cuts induce significant relocation of workers and firms toward large cities. The left panel of Figure 6 illustrates percentage changes in population density and the measure of vacancies. Population density in the top 10% of regions increases by 25% as their effective tax burden decreases.
Figure 5. Federal Income Tax Across Regions

Notes: Data source: CPS March (2017, 2019). The ratio between after-tax income and adjusted gross income is approximated as a function of log population density.

The inflow of workers in higher-\(\ell\) locations increases vacancy contact rates and thus attracts more firms, which leads to a 25% increase in the number of vacancies in the top 10% of regions. The right panel shows changes in average productivity across \(\ell\). As less productive workers and firms relocate to higher-\(\ell\) locations, local productivity falls in all regions. This observation highlights the fact that local productivity is endogenous and depends on the types of workers and firms that sort into each location.

Despite the large-scale spatial reallocation, changes in aggregate output and GDP are marginal, increasing only by 0.004% and 0.321%. The change in GDP is larger due to the increased profits of landowners and intermediaries. Since productivity is embodied in both workers and firms, when they move jointly—as demonstrated in the left panel of Figure 6—overall output remains virtually unchanged.

Although there is no change in output, aggregate welfare, which is defined as an equally weighted average of the values of all workers,\(^{35}\) decreases by 0.347%. This result is consistent with my theoretical analysis. Proposition 2 shows that taxing workers and firms in dense areas enhances welfare, and the progressive federal income tax has a similar effect. Thus, the tax reform, which reduces the progressivity of the federal income tax, is opposite to what the optimal policy dictates.

To investigate the sources of this welfare change, I decompose the total changes in welfare into four components: firm productivity \(g(\ell)\); housing market \((r(\ell), \Pi_r, T_r(\ell))\); labor market tightness \(\lambda(\ell)\); and taxes \((\Pi_w, \tau_w(\ell), \Pi_c)\). To quantify the contribution of each component, I first compute changes in

\(^{35}\) In other words, I assume the planner is utilitarian. In Section 3.2, it was unnecessary to choose specific weights of the planner. However, under Stone-Geary preferences, housing and final good consumption exhibit complementarity, and welfare depends on the distribution of tradable goods.
the value of each worker due to changes in the relevant variable in the value of workers (13), holding all other variables constant. For example, in assessing the impact of firm productivity, I plug in firm productivity \( y(\ell') \) in a new location chosen by a worker post-tax cut, taking into account concurrent firm relocations. Then, I take the averages of these values to compute the aggregate welfare change attributable to each component. Table 4 summarizes the results.

A decline in welfare primarily comes from the housing market. As spatial concentration in the economy intensifies, aggregate housing costs increase. In contrast, the contributions of other mechanisms are limited. First, the aggregate welfare impact from changes in firm types cannot be substantial. Simply adjusting the matching schedule between workers and firms is insufficient to yield aggregate benefits, because the improvement of matched firm types for some workers inevitably implies worse firm types for others. Similarly, changes in market tightness and tax cannot increase aggregate welfare much.

In the left panel of Figure A.5, I plot changes in the value of unemployed workers in each productivity percentile. Since the tax schedule is less progressive than before, less productive workers with lower incomes experience a more pronounced decline in welfare. However, even high-income earners experience a net loss because their gains from reduced tax rates are offset by increased housing rents.

I now examine the importance of incorporating both worker and firm sorting in a unified framework. To illustrate this point, I consider a one-sided sorting model, in which heterogeneous workers sort across space while firms are assumed to be homogeneous. Instead, I introduce heterogeneity in location-specific productivity, as is commonly assumed in the literature (e.g., Allen and Arkolakis, 2014; Diamond, 2016; Redding, 2016).\(^{36}\) When local TFP is estimated in the same way as firm productivity in my two-sided

\(^{36}\)To be specific, I assume that a match formed in location \( \ell \) produces output that depends on location-specific productivity and worker productivity. I also introduce a location-specific firm amenity \( B_f(\ell) \) as a residual to ensure that the free mobility condition of firms holds.
Table 4: Welfare Impact of Tax Cut (% Change)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mechanism</th>
<th>Firm (Location)</th>
<th>Housing</th>
<th>Tightness</th>
<th>Tax</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Two-sided</td>
<td>-0.046</td>
<td>-0.242</td>
<td>0.011</td>
<td>-0.063</td>
<td>-0.347</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One-sided</td>
<td>0.527</td>
<td>-0.309</td>
<td>0.279</td>
<td>0.027</td>
<td>0.470</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Notes:* The first column shows the percentage change in welfare due to firm types and local TFP in the two-sided and one-sided sorting models, respectively.

sorting model, estimated local TFP is identical to the estimated firm productivity $y(ℓ)$ across locations. Importantly, this one-sided sorting model is equally successful in explaining the documented spatial disparities across regions.

Upon implementing the same tax reform within this one-sided sorting model, it is interesting that changes in population density and measure of vacancies across regions are comparable to those predicted by the two-sided sorting model, depicted in the left panel of Figure 6. Population density in the top 10% of locations increases by 21%.

Failing to account for firm sorting, however, leads to an overly optimistic assessment of changes in output and welfare. Aggregate output and GDP increase by 0.68% and 1%, respectively. When workers relocate to high-$ℓ$ locations, they are able to produce more output due to higher local TFP. Thus, in a one-sided sorting economy, if congestion costs are not taken into account, it is always advantageous to have more workers and firms in high-$ℓ$ locations, which is not the case in the two-sided sorting model. This gain in output ultimately results in an increase in aggregate welfare of 0.47%. From Table 4, the positive effect of moving workers and firms to higher local TFP outweighs the negative effect from the other three mechanisms. This economy also enjoys additional benefits from a 0.6% increase in firm entry.

**Housing regulation.** Besides the federal income tax cuts, my model can be applied to examine various spatial policies. In Appendix D.2, I investigate the effects of more stringent housing regulations in large U.S. metropolitan areas. The literature suggests that relaxing housing regulations in these cities can attract workers to these regions with higher income and thus substantially boost GDP (e.g., Crews, 2023; Hsieh and Moretti, 2019; Martellini, 2022).
However, my analysis reveals that despite the significant increase in employment in densely populated areas, relaxing housing regulations in these areas reduces welfare. Both workers and firms simultaneously relocate to high-\(ℓ\) locations, which keeps output unchanged while leading to increased aggregate congestion costs in housing markets. In contrast, in the one-sided sorting model in which firms are homogeneous but local TFP varies, the gains from higher local TFP dominate the increase in congestion costs. As a result, aggregate welfare improves in this model and aligns with findings in the literature. This stark contrast in results underscores how two-sided sorting, which allows both heterogeneous workers and firms to respond to policies, can provide qualitatively different normative implications.

7. Conclusion

In this paper, I show that two-sided sorting of heterogeneous workers and firms alone can account for spatial disparities in several dimensions, including productivity, income, and population density. When both workers and firms simultaneously sort across space, the sorting of one side sustains the sorting of the other side, without requiring other factors as a source of sorting. In addition, allowing both groups to relocate across space provides unique normative implications for government policy.

I characterize the equilibrium that exhibits positive assortative matching between workers and firms across space. When workers and firms randomly match within local labor markets, their location choices determine their expected income and profits. These benefits are larger in locations inhabited by more productive workers and firms, which in turn draw a larger number of workers and firms. Due to production complementarity, highly productive agents gain relatively more and are willing to pay higher costs to reside or operate in these areas.

Two-sided sorting presents unique policy implications because both workers and firms, which embody productivity, can relocate in response to government policy. The government can reduce unnecessary congestion costs without reducing output by dispersing productive workers and firms to less densely populated locations. However, ignoring the sorting of one side leads to a different conclusion. On the one hand, spatial disparities can be equally well explained, for example, by introducing local TFP instead. On the other hand, because the productivity of one side is inherent to locations, dispersing economic activities to less densely populated areas leads to substantial output losses, which may outweigh any gains from reduced congestion costs.
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Appendix

A. Omitted Proofs

A.1 Derivations

The match surplus of workers and vacancies solve

\[ \hat{\rho}(V^c(x, y, \ell) - V^u(x, \ell)) = w(x, y, \ell) - bx - \lambda(\ell)[V^c(x, y(\ell), \ell) - V^u(x, \ell)], \]
\[ \hat{\rho}(V^p(x, y, \ell) - V^v(y, \ell)) = xy - w(x, y, \ell) - q(\ell)[V^p(x(\ell), y, \ell) - V^v(y, \ell)] + \delta, V^v(y, \ell), \]

where \( \hat{\rho} \equiv \rho + \delta \). Combining the two gives the HJB equation for the joint surplus, \( S = V^c - V^u + V^p - V^v \),

\[ \hat{\rho}S(x, y, \ell) = xy - \lambda(\ell)[V^c(x, y(\ell), \ell) - V^u(x, \ell)] - q(\ell)[V^p(x(\ell), y, \ell) - V^v(y, \ell)] + \delta, V^v(y, \ell) \]
\[ = xy - bx - \beta \lambda(\ell)S(x, y(\ell), \ell) - \frac{\rho}{\hat{\rho}}(1 - \beta)q(\ell)S(x(\ell), y, \ell), \]  
(A.2)

where I use the bargaining solution and (1) for the second line. Distinguishing the productivity of workers and firms of a given match \((x, y)\) from productivity of local workers and firms \((x(\ell), y(\ell))\) is important for determining the outside option value. Under a pure assignment, \(x = x(\ell)\) and \(y = y(\ell)\) in equilibrium, and the surplus of a match in \(\ell\) simplifies to

\[ S(x(\ell), y(\ell), \ell) = \frac{1}{\hat{\rho} + \beta \lambda(\ell) + (1 - \beta)q(\ell)}(x(\ell)y(\ell) - bx(\ell)), \]

where I define \(1 - \hat{\beta} \equiv \frac{\rho}{\hat{\rho} + \beta \lambda(\ell)}(1 - \beta)\) to simplify the notation. Combining this equation with (A.2), I obtain the below:

\[ S(x(\ell), y(\ell), \ell) = \frac{1}{\hat{\rho} + (1 - \beta)q(\ell)}((y - b)x(\ell) - \frac{\beta \lambda(\ell)}{\hat{\rho} + \beta \lambda(\ell) + (1 - \beta)q(\ell)}(y(\ell) - b)x(\ell)), \]
\[ S(x, y(\ell), \ell) = \frac{1}{\hat{\rho} + \beta \lambda(\ell)}((y(\ell) - b)x - \frac{(1 - \hat{\beta})q(\ell)}{\hat{\rho} + \beta \lambda(\ell) + (1 - \beta)q(\ell)}(y(\ell) - b)x(\ell)), \]
\[ S(x, y, \ell) = (y - b)x - \frac{\beta \lambda(\ell)}{\hat{\rho} + \beta \lambda(\ell) + (1 - \beta)q(\ell)}x(y(\ell) - b) - \frac{(1 - \hat{\beta})q(\ell)}{\hat{\rho} + \beta \lambda(\ell) + (1 - \beta)q(\ell)}(y - b)x(\ell) \]
\[ + \frac{\beta \lambda(\ell)(1 - \hat{\beta})q(\ell)}{\hat{\rho} + \beta \lambda(\ell) + (1 - \beta)q(\ell)}\left(\frac{1}{\hat{\rho} + \beta \lambda(\ell)} + \frac{1}{\hat{\rho} + (1 - \beta)q(\ell)}\right)(y(\ell) - b)x(\ell). \]
Then, the equilibrium can be characterized by two strictly increasing location-matching functions, I define four terms, thus

\[
q_{\text{firm is worse in }} = \dots
\]

show this, I proceed by contradiction. That is, suppose there exist two locations \( \ell_1 > \ell_2 \) and two types of workers and firms such that \( x(\ell_1) = x^g > x(\ell_2) = x^b \) while \( y(\ell_1) = y^b < y(\ell_2) = y^g \).

Using these expressions and (A.1), I can solve for wages,

\[
w(x, y, \ell) = bx + \beta(y - b)x + (1 - \beta)\beta\lambda(\ell)S(x, y(\ell), \ell) - \beta(1 - \beta)q(\ell)S(x(\ell), y, \ell) \\
= bx + \beta(y - b)x + \beta\left(\frac{\lambda(\ell)(1 - \beta)}{\tilde{\rho} + \beta\lambda(\ell)}(y(\ell) - b)x - \frac{(1 - \beta)q(\ell)}{\tilde{\rho} + (1 - \beta)q(\ell)}(y - b)x(\ell)\right) \\
\]

\[
+ \frac{\beta \lambda(\ell)(1 - \tilde{\beta})q(\ell)}{\tilde{\rho} + \beta \lambda(\ell) + (1 - \beta)q(\ell)} \left( -\frac{(1 - \beta)}{\tilde{\rho} + \beta \lambda(\ell)} + \frac{\beta}{\tilde{\rho} + (1 - \beta)q(\ell)} \right)(y(\ell) - b)x(\ell).
\]

Imposing \( x = x(\ell) \) and \( y = y(\ell) \), the equilibrium wages simplify to

\[
w(x(\ell), y(\ell), \ell) = \left( b + \beta(y(\ell) - b) + \beta\frac{(1 - \beta)\lambda(\ell) - (1 - \tilde{\beta})q(\ell)}{\tilde{\rho} + \beta \lambda(\ell) + (1 - \beta)q(\ell)}(y(\ell) - b) \right)x(\ell).
\]

Finally, I can solve for the value of workers and firms when choosing \( \ell \). First, plug in \( S(x, y(\ell), \ell) \) (\( S(x(\ell), y, \ell) \), respectively) to the equation \( V^w(x, \ell) \) (\( V^v(y, \ell) \), respectively). The value of workers choosing location \( \ell \) simply equals the value of unemployed workers, \( V^w(x, \ell) \). The flow value of firms choosing \( \ell \), \( \rho V^v(y, \ell) \), equals the value of posting \( \delta_w \) effective units of vacancies, \( \delta_v V^v(y, \ell) \), net of overhead costs, \( c(\ell) \).

\[
\rho V^w(x, \ell) = bx + \frac{\beta \lambda(\ell)}{\tilde{\rho} + \beta \lambda(\ell)}(y(\ell) - b) \left(x - \frac{(1 - \tilde{\beta})q}{\tilde{\rho} + \beta \lambda(\ell) + (1 - \beta)q}(x(\ell))\right) - \tilde{hr}(\ell),
\]

\[
\rho V^v(y, \ell) = \frac{\delta_w}{\rho} x(\ell) \frac{(1 - \tilde{\beta})q(\ell)}{\tilde{\rho} + (1 - \beta)q(\ell)} \left(y - b - \frac{\beta \lambda}{\tilde{\rho} + \beta \lambda + (1 - \beta)q}(y(\ell) - b) \right) - c(\ell).
\]

I define four terms, \( A_w, A_f, B_w, \) and \( B_f \), which will be referred to frequently in the proofs.

### A.2 Proof of Proposition 1

I prove Proposition 1 in steps. First, I show that a pure assignment equilibrium, if it exists, should be PAM. Then, the equilibrium can be characterized by two strictly increasing location-matching functions, \( x(\ell) \) and \( y(\ell) \). Second, I prove the existence. Finally, I show that population density and wages are increasing in \( \ell \).

**PAM between workers and firms.** I first show that if a pure assignment equilibrium exists, it has to be PAM. To show this, I proceed by contradiction. That is, suppose there exist two locations \( \ell_1 > \ell_2 \) and two types of workers and firms such that \( x(\ell_1) = x^g > x(\ell_2) = x^b \) while \( y(\ell_1) = y^b < y(\ell_2) = y^g \).

The location choices of workers and firms imply that \( A_w(\ell_1) > A_w(\ell_2) \) and \( A_f(\ell_2) > A_f(\ell_1) \). Given that firm is worse in \( \ell_1 \), for \( A_w(\ell) \) to be larger in \( \ell_1 \), job arrival rate should be sufficiently higher, \( \lambda(\ell_1) > \lambda(\ell_2) \), and thus \( q(\ell_2) > q(\ell_1) \). These observations imply that \( B_w(\ell) = \frac{\tilde{\rho}}{\frac{\beta}{\beta + (1 - \beta)q(\ell)}} \frac{1 - \tilde{\beta} + (1 - \beta)q(\ell)}{\beta + (1 - \beta)q(\ell)} A_f(\ell) \) is larger in \( \ell_2 \). Thus,
\(A_w(\ell)(x - B_w(\ell))\) is supermodular in \((\ell, x)\), log-submodular in \((\ell, x)\), and increasing in \(x\), implying that it is increasing in \(\ell\). I conclude that \(r(\ell_1) > r(\ell_2)\) for \(\ell_2\) to be chosen by workers \(x^b\).

Similarly, \(B_f(\ell) = \frac{\rho + \beta \lambda(\ell)}{\rho + \beta \lambda(\ell) + (1 - \beta) w(\ell)} A_w(\ell)\) is larger in \(\ell_1\) from \(A_w(\ell_1) > A_w(\ell_2)\) and \(\lambda(\ell_1) > \lambda(\ell_2)\), which implies that \(A_f(\ell)(y - b - B_f(\ell))\) is submodular in \((\ell, y)\), log-supermodular in \((\ell, y)\), and increases in \(y\). Thus, I conclude that it is decreasing in \(\ell\), which then implies \(c(\ell_2) > c(\ell_1)\) for firms \(g^b\) to choose \(\ell_1\).

As production costs of housing and business services are convex, two inequalities on \(r(\ell)\) and \(c(\ell)\) imply that \(L(\ell_1) > L(\ell_2)\) and \(N(\ell_1) < N(\ell_2)\). Differentiating \(\theta(\ell) = \frac{V(\ell)}{u(\ell)L(\ell)}\) with respect to \(\ell\), and using steady-state flow-balance conditions (6),

\[
\frac{\theta'(\ell)}{\theta(\ell)} = \frac{\lambda(\ell) + \delta}{-\varepsilon_q(\theta(\ell))\lambda(\ell) + \delta \left( \frac{N'(\ell)}{N(\ell)} - \frac{L'(\ell)}{L(\ell)} \right)},
\]

where I define \(\varepsilon_q(\theta) = \frac{\gamma'(\theta)}{\theta}\) as the elasticity of vacancy contact rates. Similarly, I define the elasticity of job arrival rates, \(\varepsilon_\lambda(\theta) = \frac{\lambda'(\theta)}{\lambda(\theta)}\), for later. Observing \(\varepsilon_\lambda > 0\) and \(\varepsilon_q < 0\), \(\theta\) is increasing in \(\frac{N}{L}\) in steady state. Since I established \(\frac{N(\ell_2)}{L(\ell_2)} > \frac{N(\ell_1)}{L(\ell_1)}\), the above equation implies \(\theta(\ell_2) > \theta(\ell_1)\). This contradicts to \(\lambda(\ell_1) > \lambda(\ell_2)\).

Thus, I conclude that workers and firms positively sort across space.

**Existence.** I show the existence of a pure assignment equilibrium in two steps. In the first step, I show that the equilibrium can be represented by a solution of differential equations. In the second step, I show that there exists an initial condition that satisfies the boundary conditions on worker and firm productivity.

**Step 1** Given that a pure assignment equilibrium exhibits PAM, I can focus on \((x(\ell), y(\ell))\), which are increasing in \(\ell\). Because of the continuity of the productivity distributions, \(Q_w\) and \(Q_f\), these two functions are strictly increasing.

Observe that \(x(\ell)\) and \(y(\ell)\) are differentiable almost everywhere as increasing. Guess that these two functions are twice differentiable, which will be verified later. Then, location choices can be characterized by the below first order conditions of workers and firms,

\[
\begin{align*}
[f_w] &\quad A'_w(\ell)x(\ell) - (A_w(\ell)B_w(\ell))' - \tilde{h}c_r' (\tilde{h}L(\ell))L'(\ell) = 0, \\
[f_f] &\quad A'_f(\ell)(y(\ell) - b) - (A_f(\ell)B_f(\ell))' - c_v(N(\ell))N'(\ell) = 0,
\end{align*}
\]

Together with the boundary conditions, \(x(\ell) = \ell, x(\ell) = x, y(\ell) = \ell\), and \(y(\ell) = y\), as well as steady state flow-balance conditions (6). Note that I already plugged in housing and business services market clearing conditions.

I can summarize two conditions by defining a function \(f, f(z, z', z'') = 0 \in \mathbb{R}^2\) where \(z(\ell) = (x(\ell), y(\ell))\). If \(Dz^n f\) is continuous and \(\det Dz^n f(z, z', z'') \neq 0\), then there exists a unique continuously differentiable function \(g\) such that \(z'' = g(z, z')\) by Implicit Function Theorem. From now on, I omit location index \(\ell\) unless it creates any confusion.
To show that $\det D_{x'} f(z, z', z'') = \det \left( \begin{array}{cc} \frac{\partial f_w}{\partial x'}, & \frac{\partial f_w}{\partial y'} \\ \frac{\partial f_f}{\partial x'}, & \frac{\partial f_f}{\partial y'} \end{array} \right) \neq 0$, obtain several useful expressions,

$$A'_w(\ell) = A_w(\ell) \left( \varepsilon_\lambda(\theta) \frac{\varphi}{\bar{\rho} + \beta \lambda} + \frac{y'}{\rho} \right),$$

$$B'_w(\ell) = B_w(\ell) \left( -\frac{-\varphi'}{\rho} \varepsilon_\lambda(\theta) + \beta \lambda / \rho \left( \frac{\bar{\rho} + \beta \lambda(\theta) + (1 - \beta)q(\theta)}{x'} \right) \right),$$

$$A'_f(\ell) = A_f(\ell) \left( \varepsilon_q(\theta) \frac{\varphi}{\bar{\rho} + (1 - \beta)q} + \frac{y'}{\rho} \right),$$

$$B'_f(\ell) = B_f(\ell) \left( \frac{\bar{\rho} \varepsilon_\lambda(\theta) \varphi}{\bar{\rho} + \beta \lambda(\theta) + (1 - \beta)q(\theta)} \right) + \frac{y'}{\rho - y - b},$$

where I use $\frac{\partial f'_w}{\partial x'} = M_w q_w(x)$ and $\frac{\partial N'}{\partial y'} = M_f q_f(y)$.

Evaluating worker and firm sorting conditions at $x = x(\ell)$ and $y = y(\ell)$,

$$\frac{A_w(x)}{\bar{\rho} + \beta \lambda + (1 - \beta)q} \left( (\bar{\rho} + \beta \lambda) \frac{y'}{y - b} - (1 - \beta) \frac{x'}{x} + \beta \lambda \left( \frac{\varepsilon_\lambda(\theta)}{\bar{\rho} + \beta \lambda + (1 - \beta)q} \right) \right) - \frac{(1 - \beta)q}{\bar{\rho} + \beta \lambda + (1 - \beta)q} \frac{\beta \lambda}{\theta} - \bar{h}' = 0,$$

$$\frac{A_f(y - b)}{\bar{\rho} + \beta \lambda + (1 - \beta)q} \left( (\bar{\rho} + (1 - \beta)q) \frac{x'}{x} - \beta \lambda \frac{y'}{y - b} - \frac{\beta \lambda}{\rho} \left( \frac{\varepsilon_q(\theta)}{\bar{\rho} + \beta \lambda + (1 - \beta)q} \right) \right) - \frac{\beta \lambda}{\rho + \beta \lambda + (1 - \beta)q} (1 - \beta)q - \bar{c}' = 0.$$

From (A.3), $\varphi' / \varphi = \zeta(z, z') \left( \frac{\varphi'}{\varphi} - \frac{L'}{L} \right)$, where $\zeta(z, z') = \frac{(\varphi - \bar{\beta}) \lambda}{\varphi(\theta) \lambda + \delta}$ which is always strictly positive. Differentiating this term with respect to $x''$ and $y''$, I obtain $\frac{\partial \varphi'}{\partial \varphi'} = -\zeta M w q_w$ and $\frac{\partial \varphi''}{\partial \varphi''} = \zeta M f q_f$, which then gives the below.

$$\det \left( \begin{array}{cc} \frac{\partial f_w}{\partial x'}, & \frac{\partial f_w}{\partial y'} \\ \frac{\partial f_f}{\partial x'}, & \frac{\partial f_f}{\partial y'} \end{array} \right) = \det \left( \begin{array}{cc} -a_w b_w - \bar{h} M w q_w C'_r(\bar{h} L) & a_f b_f \\ a_w b_f & -a_f b_f - M_f q_f C'_r(N) \end{array} \right),$$

where I define four positive terms: $a_w = \frac{M_w q_w}{L}$, $a_f = \frac{M_f q_f}{N}$, $b_w = \frac{A_w x \bar{\rho}}{\bar{\rho} + \beta \lambda + (1 - \beta)q} \left( \varepsilon_\lambda - \frac{(1 - \beta)q}{\bar{\rho} + \beta \lambda + (1 - \beta)q} \varepsilon_q \right)$, and $b_f = \frac{A_f(y - b) \bar{\rho}}{\bar{\rho} + \beta \lambda + (1 - \beta)q} \left( -\varepsilon_q + \frac{\beta \lambda}{\rho + \beta \lambda + (1 - \beta)q} \varepsilon_\lambda \right)$. It is easy to check that the determinant of the matrix is positive when cost functions are convex—i.e., $C'_r, C'_u > 0$.

Finally, observe that $D_{x'} f$ is continuous when $C_r, C_v, Q_w$, and $Q_f$ are twice continuously differentiable, and $z'$ is continuously differentiable, which is assumed at this point. Then, I can verify that for a given $(z(\ell), z'(\ell))$, $z''(\cdot)$ exists and is continuous by the theorem.

**Step 2** From step 1, I can represent the first order condition of location choices as differential equations of $(z, z')$, i.e., $(z', z'') = (z', g(z, z'))$. Find $\pi'$ such that when $z' > \pi', C'_r(\bar{h} M w q_w(x(\ell)) x'(\ell)) > \pi \bar{y}$ and $C'_u(M_f q_f(y(\ell)) y'(\ell)) > \pi \bar{y}$. Then, an equilibrium $z'$ is bounded above by $\pi'$. If not, workers or firms would always deviate to cheaper locations even at the expense of lower wages or profits. As $g(z, z')$ is continuous and defined on a compact set, it is Lipschitz continuous.

Given an initial condition $(z, z')$, the equilibrium exists from the standard ODE theorem. However, instead of two initial conditions, I have the initial and terminal conditions on $z$, which are $z(\ell) = \bar{z}$ and $z(\bar{t}) = \pi$. I will show
that there exists at least one initial condition $z'(\ell)$ that gives $z(\ell) = \pi$. For this purpose, I show that guessing a too small (large) initial condition $z'(\ell)$ gives a too small (large) terminal point $z(\ell)$. Then, I use the Poincaré-Miranda theorem, which is a generalization of the intermediate value theorem.

**Step 2** The first part is to show that when an initial guess is too small, $z'(\ell) \to 0$, a terminal point $z(\ell)$ becomes smaller than $\pi$.

Let $g^z$ represents the first component of $g$, i.e., $x''$. For now, suppose that $y(\ell)$ is given. By Lipschitz continuity, there exists $K$ such that $|g^z(z, a) - g^z(z, b)| \leq K|a - b|$ for all $a, b \in [0, (\pi')^2]$. Make a guess on $x'(\ell) = \varepsilon$. Then, $|g^z(z, z')| \leq |g^z(z, \varepsilon)| + K|z' - \varepsilon|$. Define $\sup_{x \in [z, \pi]} |g^z(z, \varepsilon)| = g_\varepsilon$. Then,

$$z'(\ell) = z'(\ell) + \int_\ell^\varepsilon z''(s) \, ds \leq z'(\ell) + \int_\ell^\varepsilon (g_x + K\varepsilon + K|z'(s)|) \, ds$$

$$= \varepsilon + (g_x + K\varepsilon)\ell + K \int_\ell^\varepsilon z'(s) \, ds = \varepsilon + (g_x + K\varepsilon)\ell + K(z(\ell) - z(\ell)).$$

Define an auxiliary function $\hat{z}(\ell)$ s.t. (1) $\dot{\hat{z}}(\ell) = z(\ell)$ and (2) $\ddot{\hat{z}}(\ell) = K \dot{\hat{z}}(\ell) + \varepsilon + (g_x + K\varepsilon)\ell - K z(\ell)$. A function defined as the difference between $z$ and $\hat{z}$, $t(\ell) = \hat{z}(\ell) - z(\ell)$, satisfies $t(\ell) = t'(\ell) = 0$ and $t'(\ell) \geq K t(\ell)$. Finally, define $T(\ell) = t(\ell)e^{-K\ell\varepsilon}$. As $T'(\ell) = (t'(\ell) - K t(\ell))e^{-K\ell\varepsilon} \geq 0$, I conclude that $T(\ell) = t(\ell)e^{-K\ell\varepsilon} \geq T(0) = 0$, which leads to $t(\ell) \geq 0$. Thus, $\hat{z}(\ell) \geq z(\ell)$.

The solution of $\ddot{\hat{z}}(\ell) = K \dot{\hat{z}}(\ell) + a\ell + b$, where $a = g_x + K\varepsilon, b = \varepsilon - K z$, is given by

$$\hat{z}(\ell) = c_1 e^{K\ell - a\ell} + c_2.$$  

I have two initial conditions $\hat{z}(\ell) = z, \dot{\hat{z}}(\ell) = \varepsilon$, which give $c_1 = \frac{1}{K}(2\varepsilon + \frac{a}{K})$ and $c_2 = z - \frac{1}{K}(2\varepsilon + \frac{a}{K})$. As a result, the terminal value of $\hat{z}$ becomes

$$\hat{z}(\ell) = \hat{z} + \frac{2\varepsilon + g_x}{K}(e^{K\ell} - 1) - \frac{a}{K}.$$  

The final step of the first part is to show that $g_x = \sup_{x \in [z, \pi]} |g^x(z, \varepsilon)|$ converges to zero when $\varepsilon$ goes to zero. It is sufficient to show that $\lim_{x \to 0} g^x(z, \varepsilon) = 0$ for all $x$, as $g^x$ is a continuous function defined on a compact set. The problem of firms is symmetric, and $\lim_{x \to 0} g^y(z, \varepsilon) = 0$ for all $y$, where $g^y$ represents the second component of $g$, i.e., $y''$, for a given $x(\ell)$, is sufficient.

I first show the limit holds for workers $g^z$. When $x'$ goes to zero, population density $L = M w q_w(x(\ell)) x'(\ell)$ goes to zero as well, as $q_w(x(\ell)) \leq \sup_{x \in [z, \pi]} Q'_w(x)$ is bounded due to the assumption $Q_w \in C^2$. Then, equation (A.3) gives $g^w = \frac{y^w}{\sigma} \to \frac{1}{-\varepsilon_q} \left( \frac{\varepsilon'_w}{\varepsilon'_w - \frac{L}{\beta}} \right)$, and the worker sorting condition becomes,

$$(y - b)x - y' = (y - b)x \left( \frac{\varepsilon}{\beta} - \frac{1}{L} \right) + \tilde{h} C'_w(\tilde{h} L).$$

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The left-hand side is bounded for a given \( y \) while \( C''_v \) on right-hand side diverges to infinity when population density goes to zero, implying that \( L' = M_w(q_w(x)(x')^2 + q_w(x)x'') \) should converge to zero. Thus, I conclude that \( g^x = x'' \) should converge to zero.

I follow the same steps to obtain the result for firms \( g^\rho \). The measure of firms \( N \) converges to zero when \( y' \) goes to zero, and thus \( \frac{q'}{y} \to \frac{N'}{N} - \frac{L'}{N} \). The firm sorting condition becomes

\[
\frac{\delta_v x}{\rho + \delta_v} \frac{1 - \beta}{1 - \beta} \left( y - b \right) \frac{x'}{x} = \left( \frac{\delta_v x}{\rho + \delta_v} \frac{1 - \beta}{y - b} \frac{\rho}{1 - \beta} - \frac{\rho}{\beta} \right) + C''_v(N(\ell)) N'(\ell).
\]

As \( C''_v \) diverges to infinity, the above equality indicates that \( g^\rho = y'' \) should converge to zero.

**Step 2 (ii)** The second part is to show that sending an initial condition \( x'(\ell) \) to infinity leads to a terminal point that is larger than \( \bar{z} \). First, I show the worker side. Consider a given \( y(\ell) \) and a location \( \ell \). When \( x'(\ell) \) goes to infinity, the firm sorting condition becomes,

\[
x(y - b) \left( \frac{x'}{x} - \frac{\rho}{1 - \beta} \frac{\rho'}{\theta} - \frac{\beta}{1 - \beta} \right) = C''_v(N) N'(\ell).
\]

For the above equality to hold, I have \( \frac{\rho}{1 - \beta} \frac{\rho'}{\theta} = \frac{\beta}{1 - \beta} + o(x') \) where \( o(x') \) is the term that converges to 0 when \( x' \to \infty \). Plugging this into the sorting condition of workers and taking the the limit,

\[
\frac{\beta \lambda}{\bar{\rho} + \beta \lambda} (y - b) \left( \frac{\xi \lambda x'}{\rho_\xi} \frac{\rho'}{\theta} - \frac{\beta}{1 - \beta} + o(x') \right) = \bar{h} C''_v(\bar{h} L) L'.
\]

In the limit, the left-hand side is positive, and I conclude that \( L'(\ell) \) is weakly positive. In short, when worker productivity increases infinitely as \( \ell \) increases, the market tightness also increases for the firm sorting condition to hold. Thus, workers prefer higher-\( \ell \) locations, which implies increasing housing rents and population density.

Similarly, I can show \( N \) is increasing in \( \ell \) when \( y' \) goes to infinity for a given \( x(\ell) \), plugging in \( -\frac{\rho}{\rho} = \frac{\beta \lambda}{\xi \lambda} y' + o(y') \), obtained from the worker sorting condition, into the firm sorting condition,

\[
\frac{\delta_v}{\bar{\rho}} \left( \frac{1 - \beta}{1 - \beta} \right) x \left( \frac{-\rho}{\xi \lambda} \frac{y'}{y - b} + o(y') \right) = C''_v(N) N',
\]

where \( o(y') \) is the term that converges to 0 when \( y' \to \infty \).

From the above, \( L(\ell) = M_w q_w(x(\ell)) x'(\ell) \) is increasing at \( \ell \) when \( x'(\ell) \) diverges to infinity. As a result, if \( x'(\ell) \) is sufficiently large, \( L' \) will be increasing in \( \ell \in [\xi, \bar{\ell}] \). Then, below inequality holds for all \( \ell \),

\[
x'(\ell) \geq \frac{q(x(\ell))}{q(x(\ell))} x(\ell) \geq \frac{q_w(x(\ell))}{\sup_{x \in [\xi, \bar{\ell}]} q_w(x)} x'(\ell).
\]
The above implies that \( x(\ell) > \bar{x} \). Following the same step, the same is true for firms. Thus, I conclude that if an initial condition is sufficiently large for a given schedule of the other, the terminal point would be larger than the maximum of the productivity level.

**Step 3** Consider a continuous mapping \( p_a(a'(\ell)) = a(\ell) - \bar{x} \) for \( a = x, y \), where \( a(\ell) \) is given by the solution of ODE defined above by sorting conditions. The continuity of this function is guaranteed by the continuity of \( g(\cdot) \). From the step 2-(i), the mapping \( p_a \) gives negative values when \( a'(\ell) \) goes to zero. From the step 2-(ii), I can find a sufficiently large \( N \) such that the mapping \( p_a \) gives a positive value when \( a' \) is larger than \( N \). By Pointcaré-Miranda theorem, there exists \( z'(\ell) \in [0, N]^2 \) that gives \( z(\ell) = \bar{z} \). Using these values as an initial point, the standard ODE theorem gives the existence of an equilibrium. Note that this result does not guarantee the uniqueness.

**Population density and wages.** Housing rents and thus population density increase in \( \ell \), \( r'(\ell) > 0 \), when \( A_w(\ell)x(\ell) - (A_w(\ell)B_w(\ell))' > 0 \). Otherwise, all workers would prefer higher-\( \ell \) locations. The sufficient condition for this inequality is

\[
A_w'(\ell)E > A_w'(\ell)B_w(\ell) + A_w(\ell)B_w'(\ell).
\]

Under PAM, \( A_w'(\ell) > 0 \) for all \( \ell \). Note that the right-hand side converges to zero when \( \delta_v \) diverges to infinity so that \( 1 - \beta \) converges to zero. Thus, there exists \( \bar{\delta}_v \) such that population density increases when \( \delta_v > \bar{\delta}_v \).

I now show wages also increase in \( \ell \). Under PAM, wage increases in \( \ell \) if

\[
\left( \frac{(1 - \beta)\lambda(\ell)}{\rho + \beta \lambda(\ell) + (1 - \beta)q(\ell)}(y(\ell) - b) \right)'x(\ell) - \left( \frac{1 - \beta}{\rho + \beta \lambda(\ell) + (1 - \beta)q(\ell)}(y(\ell) - b)x(\ell) \right)' > 0.
\]

The above converges to \( A_w'(\ell)x(\ell) \) when \( 1 - \beta \) converges to zero, which is positive as \( A_w \) is increasing in \( \ell \). Thus, I can find \( \bar{\delta}_v \) such that the above inequality holds if \( \delta_v > \bar{\delta}_v \).

### A.3 Proofs of Section 3.2

**Proof of Lemma 1.** The planner chooses the (potentially non-pure) assignment of workers and firms—shares of workers of \( x \) assigned to locations smaller than \( \ell \), \( \bar{m}_w(\ell|x) \), and shares of firms of \( y \) assigned to locations smaller than \( \ell \), \( \bar{m}_f(\ell|y) \) that solves the following problem:

\[
\max_{\bar{m}_w(\ell|x), \bar{m}_f(\ell|y)} \int_{\ell}^{\bar{\ell}} \left[ E[x|\ell]E[y|\ell]\{1 - u(\ell)\}L(\ell) - C_r(\bar{h}L(\ell)) - C_v(V(\ell)) \right] d\ell
\]

s.t. \[
\int_{\ell}^{\bar{\ell}} \frac{L(\ell')}{{M_w}} d\ell' = \int_x \bar{m}_w(\ell|x)q_w(x) dx, \quad \int_{\ell}^{\bar{\ell}} \frac{V(\ell')}{{M_f}} d\ell' = \int_y \bar{m}_f(\ell|y)q_f(x) dy, \quad u(\ell) = \frac{\delta}{\delta + \lambda(\ell)}, \quad \forall \ell
\]

where \( E[x|\ell] \) and \( E[y|\ell] \) are the average productivity of workers and firms assigned to location \( \ell \).
I first show that the optimal allocation is PAM, i.e., the assignment is pure and strictly increasing. I proceed by contradiction. Suppose there exists two locations \( \ell, \ell' \) such that \( \mathbb{E}[x|\ell] \leq \mathbb{E}[x|\ell'] \) and \( \mathbb{E}[y|\ell] \geq \mathbb{E}[y|\ell'] \). Consider relocating workers and firms between two locations. I will simplify the notations \( a(\ell), a(\ell') \) to \( a, a' \) for \( a = x, y, L, V \). The planner problem, focusing on these two locations, is choosing \( (x, y, x', y') \) and \( (L, V, L', V') \) to maximize \( [(1 - u')x'y'L' - C_r(\bar{h}L') - C_v(V')] + [(1 - u)yxL - C_r(\bar{h}L) - C_v(V)] \) such that \( L + L' = \bar{L}, V + V' = \bar{V}, \), \( \frac{L'}{L+L'}x + \frac{L}{L+L'}x' = X \), and \( \frac{V}{1+V'}y + \frac{V'}{1+V}y' = Y \) where \( \bar{L} (\bar{V}, \text{respectively}) \) is total measure of workers (firms, respectively), and \( X (Y, \text{respectively}) \) is an average productivity of workers (firms, respectively) in two locations.

There are four possible cases. First, consider the case such that \( \mathbb{E}[x|\ell] < \mathbb{E}[x|\ell'] \) and \( \mathbb{E}[y|\ell] > \mathbb{E}[y|\ell'] \). For \( x' > x \) and \( y' < y \) to be the optimal choice, the following conditions should hold:

\[
(1 - u')x'\frac{L'}{V'} - (1 - u)x\frac{L}{V} < 0, \quad (y')
\]
\[
(1 - u')y' - (1 - u)y > 0, \quad (x')
\]
\[
-\frac{\partial u'}{\partial y'}y'x'L' - C'_r(V') = -\frac{\partial u}{\partial x}yxL - C'_r(V), \quad (V')
\]
\[
-\frac{\partial u'}{\partial L'}y'x'L' + (1 - u')y'x' - \bar{h}C'_r(\bar{h}L') = -\frac{\partial u}{\partial L}yxL + (1 - u)yx - \bar{h}C'_r(\bar{h}L). \quad (L')
\]

Condition \((y')\) reads to \( q'x' < qx \), implying \( \frac{V'}{L'} > \frac{V}{L} \). From \((V')\) and \((L')\),

\[
\Delta C'_r(V) = \Delta\alpha uy(1 - u)x\frac{L}{V},
\]
\[
\Delta\bar{h}C'_r(\bar{h}L) = \Delta(-\alpha u(1 - u)xy + (1 - u)xy) = \Delta(1 - u)xy(1 - \alpha u),
\]

where \( \Delta \) denotes the difference between \( \ell' \) and \( \ell \). Since \( \alpha u \) is decreasing in \( \theta \), the first equation is negative while the second equation is positive. Thus, by the convexity of cost functions, \( V' < V \) and \( L' > L \), implying \( \frac{V'}{L'} < \frac{V}{L} \).

**Contradiction.**

Next, consider \( \mathbb{E}[x|\ell] = \mathbb{E}[x|\ell'] \) and \( \mathbb{E}[y|\ell] > \mathbb{E}[y|\ell'] \). From \((y')\), I obtain \( \frac{V'}{L'} > \frac{V}{L} \) as the first case. As worker productivity is identical between two locations, the condition \((x')\) becomes \( (1 - u')y' = (1 - u)y \), which implies \( u' < u \) and thus \( \frac{V'}{L'} < \frac{V}{L} \). **Contradiction.** When \( \mathbb{E}[x|\ell] < \mathbb{E}[x|\ell'] \) and \( \mathbb{E}[y|\ell] = \mathbb{E}[y|\ell'] \), the similar argument gives the contradiction.

Lastly, when \( \mathbb{E}[x|\ell] = \mathbb{E}[x|\ell'] \) and \( \mathbb{E}[y|\ell] = \mathbb{E}[y|\ell'] \), conditions \((x')\) and \((y')\) give \( V' = V \) and \( L' = L \). Then, increasing \( \mathbb{E}[x|\ell'] \) and \( \mathbb{E}[y|\ell'] \) while holding \( V', L', V, L \) constant increases the net output due to supermodularity in the output function. **Contradiction.**
Optimal allocation. Given that the optimal allocation is PAM, the planner’s problem becomes finding two increasing functions, \(x(\ell)\) and \(y(\ell)\), and can be formulated by the following Hamiltonian:

\[
\mathcal{H} = (1 - u(\ell))y(\ell)x(\ell)L(\ell) - C_v(\bar{h}L(\ell)) - C_v(V(\ell)) + \frac{\mu_w(\ell)L(\ell)}{M_w q_w(x(\ell))} + \frac{\mu_f(\ell)V(\ell)}{M_f q_f(y(\ell))} + \mu_u(\ell)\left(u(\ell) - \frac{\delta}{\delta + \lambda(\theta(\ell))}\right),
\]

where \(\mu_w\) and \(\mu_f\) are co-state variables of \(x\) and \(y\), respectively, \(\mu_u\) is the multiplier of unemployment rates, and the market tightness is defined as before, \(\theta = \frac{V}{uL}\). First order conditions are given by,

\[
\begin{align*}
0 &= (1 - u(\ell))y(\ell)x(\ell) - C_v'(L(\ell)) + \frac{\mu_w(\ell)}{M_w q_w(x(\ell))} - \frac{\mu_u(\ell)\alpha}{L(\ell)}u(\ell)(1 - u(\ell)), \quad (L) \\
\mu_w'(\ell) &= -(1 - u(\ell))y(\ell)L(\ell) + \frac{\mu_w(\ell)L(\ell)}{M_w q_w(x(\ell))} q_w'(x(\ell)), \quad (x) \\
0 &= -C_v'(V(\ell)) + \frac{\mu_f(\ell)}{M_f q_f(y(\ell))} + \frac{\mu_u(\ell)\alpha}{V(\ell)}u(\ell)(1 - u(\ell)), \quad (V) \\
\mu_f'(\ell) &= -(1 - u(\ell))x(\ell)L(\ell) + \frac{\mu_f(\ell)V(\ell)}{M_f q_f(y(\ell))} q_f'(y(\ell)), \quad (y) \\
0 &= -y(\ell)x(\ell)L(\ell) + \mu_u(\ell)(1 - \alpha(1 - u(\ell))). \quad (u)
\end{align*}
\]

From now on, I omit \(\ell\) for notational simplicity unless it causes confusions. Differentiate \((L)\) with respect to \(\ell\), and plug in \((x)\), I obtain

\[
C_v''(\bar{h}L(\ell))\bar{h}L'(\ell)L(\ell) + C_v''(V(\ell))V'(\ell)V(\ell) = 0,
\]

which is the first equation that characterizes the optimal assignment. Furthermore, rearrange \((A.5)\) and then plug
in (A.7), I obtain the second equation,
\[
\frac{1 - u}{1 - \alpha(1 - u)} \left[ \frac{(1 - \alpha) y'}{y} - \frac{\alpha u x'}{x} \right] y x
\]
\[
= C'_v L' + \frac{(1 - u) u}{(1 - \alpha(1 - u))^2} \frac{(1 - \alpha) \alpha \beta L'}{1 - \alpha(1 - u)} (1 + \frac{L}{V})^2 \frac{C''_v}{C'_v} y x.
\]
(A.8)

In sum, the optimal allocation \( \{x(\ell), y(\ell)\} \) is characterized by (A.7) and (A.8), together with boundary conditions.

Because housing and business services cost functions are convex, the condition (A.7) implies \( L'(\ell)V'(\ell) \leq 0 \). In addition, the second condition (A.8) provides the condition under which the optimal population density increases.

The planner optimally chooses to increase population density while decrease a measure of vacancy when the below inequality holds at the optimal allocation,
\[
(1 - \alpha) \frac{y'(\ell)}{y(\ell)} > \alpha u(\ell) \frac{x'(\ell)}{x(\ell)}.
\]

Proof of Proposition 2. Worker and firm sorting conditions in decentralized equilibrium are given by
\[
\frac{\partial}{\partial \ell} \left( \frac{\beta \lambda(\ell)}{\rho + \beta \lambda(\ell)} (y(\ell) - b) \left( x - \frac{(1 - \beta)q}{\hat{\rho} + \beta \lambda(1 - \beta)q} x(\ell) \right) \right) = h v'(\ell),
\]
\[
\frac{\partial}{\partial \ell} \left( \frac{\delta_v}{\rho + \delta_v} x(\ell) \left( y - b - \frac{\beta \lambda}{\hat{\rho} + \beta \lambda(1 - \beta)q} (y(\ell) - b) \right) \right) = c'(\ell).
\]

Multiply the worker sorting condition by \( L(\ell) \) and the firm sorting condition by \( V(\ell) \), and sum over the two. The expression is relatively long, and thus I will consider each component of this equation one by one.

First, gather the terms multiplied by \( y'(\ell)x(\ell) \) to obtain the first line (omitting \( y'(\ell)x(\ell) \)) and the term multiplied by \( x'(\ell)y(\ell) \) to obtain the second line (omitting \( x'(\ell)y(\ell) \)):
\[
\frac{-V \delta_v}{\rho + \delta_v \hat{\rho} + (1 - \beta)q(\ell)} \frac{(1 - \beta)q}{\rho + \delta_v \hat{\rho} + (1 - \beta)q(\ell)} + \frac{L \beta \lambda}{\rho + \beta \lambda \rho + \beta \lambda(1 - \beta)q} \left( \frac{1 - (1 - \beta)q}{\rho + \beta \lambda(1 - \beta)q} x(\ell) \right) = \frac{\beta \lambda}{\rho + \beta \lambda + (1 - \beta)q} \left( L - \frac{\delta_v}{\rho + \delta_v \hat{\rho} + (1 - \beta)q} V(\ell) \right),
\]
\[
\frac{-V \delta_v}{\rho + \delta_v \hat{\rho} + (1 - \beta)q(\ell)} \frac{(1 - \beta)q}{\rho + \delta_v \hat{\rho} + (1 - \beta)q(\ell)} \left( 1 - \frac{\beta \lambda}{\hat{\rho} + \beta \lambda + (1 - \beta)q} \right) - \frac{L \beta \lambda}{\rho + \beta \lambda + (1 - \beta)q} \left( \frac{1 - (1 - \beta)q}{\rho + \beta \lambda + (1 - \beta)q} \right) = \frac{(1 - \beta)q}{\rho + \beta \lambda + (1 - \beta)q} \left( \delta_v \frac{\beta \lambda}{\rho + \beta \lambda} L(\ell) \right).
\]

Sending \( \delta_v \) to infinity and \( \rho \) to zero, the two terms become:
\[
\lim_{\delta_v \to \infty} \frac{\beta \lambda}{\rho + \beta \lambda + (1 - \beta)q} \left( L(\ell) - \frac{\delta_v}{\rho + \delta_v \hat{\rho} + (1 - \beta)q} V(\ell) \right) y'(\ell)x(\ell) = (1 - (1 - \beta)(1 - u)) L y'(\ell)x(\ell),
\]
\[
\lim_{\rho \to 0} \frac{(1 - \beta)q}{\rho + \beta \lambda + (1 - \beta)q} \left( \frac{\delta_v V(\ell) - \beta \lambda}{\rho + \beta \lambda} L(\ell) \right) x'(\ell)y(\ell) = \frac{(1 - \beta)q}{\delta + \beta \lambda} V x'(\ell)y(\ell),
\]

where I use \( \frac{qV}{\delta} = \frac{1}{\delta} u L = (1 - u) L \) for the first line.
Next, I gather the terms related to market tightness of the firm sorting condition (omitting \(x(\ell)(y(\ell) - b)\)),

\[
V(\ell) \frac{\delta_v}{\rho + \delta_v} \left[ \frac{(1 - \beta)q(\ell)}{\rho + (1 - \beta)q(\ell)} \right]' \frac{\rho}{\beta + (1 - \beta)q} - (1 - \beta)q(\ell) \left( \frac{\beta \lambda}{\rho + (1 - \beta)q} \right)'
\]

\[
\to V(\ell) \frac{1 - \beta}{\delta} \left[ q'(\ell) \frac{\delta}{\delta + \beta \lambda} - q(\ell) \frac{\beta \lambda}{\rho + \beta \lambda} \right]'
\]

where the second line shows the limit of the first line with respect to \(\delta_v\) and \(\rho\). Gather the terms related to market tightness of the worker sorting condition (omitting \(x(\ell)(y(\ell) - b)\)) and sending \(\rho\) and \(\delta_v\) to the limit, I obtain

\[
L(\ell) \left[ \frac{(\beta \lambda)}{\delta + \beta \lambda} \right]' \frac{\rho + \beta \lambda}{\rho + \beta \lambda + (1 - \beta)q} - \frac{\beta \lambda}{\delta + \beta \lambda} \left( \frac{(1 - \beta)q}{\rho + \beta \lambda + (1 - \beta)q} \right)'
\]

Summing the above, I obtain the below:

\[
\left( \frac{\beta \lambda}{\delta + \beta \lambda} \right)' \left( L - \frac{1 - \beta}{\delta} qV \right) + \frac{1 - \beta}{\delta} \frac{\delta}{\delta + \beta \lambda} V q' = \left( \frac{\beta \lambda}{\delta + \beta \lambda} \right)' \frac{1 - 1 - \beta}{\delta - \lambda u} L + \frac{1 - \beta}{\delta} \lambda u L \frac{\delta}{\delta + \beta \lambda} \frac{q'}{q} = \frac{1}{\delta + \beta \lambda} \frac{(\beta \delta)}{(\delta + \beta \lambda)} (1 - \alpha (1 - u)) + u(\alpha - 1) \alpha \frac{\theta'}{\theta} L
\]

\[
= \frac{1 - \alpha}{\delta + \beta \lambda} (u - u) \alpha \frac{\theta'}{\theta} L = 0,
\]

where I use \(\alpha = 1 - \beta\) for the second line, and \(\frac{\delta}{\delta + \beta \lambda} = \frac{u}{1 - \alpha (1 - u)}\) for the last line which holds at steady state.

Thus, I conclude that in DE,

\[
\bar{h} r'(\ell) L(\ell) + c'(\ell) V(\ell) = \bar{h} C''_v(\bar{h} L(\ell)) L'(\ell) L(\ell) + C''_v(V(\ell)) V'(\ell) V(\ell) > 0.
\]

Note that the Hosios condition guarantees that the combined impact on the market tightness to workers and firms becomes zero. However, externalities arising from the two-sided sorting margin remain.

To compute spatial transfers that can correct externalities, I will compare the worker and firm sorting condition to the counterparts of the planner. Rearrange the worker sorting condition \(\rho V''_v(x(\ell), \ell) = 0\) and take the limit of \(\delta_v, b\) and \(\rho\),

\[
\frac{\beta \lambda}{\rho + \beta \lambda} \left( 1 - \frac{(1 - \beta)q}{\rho + \beta \lambda + (1 - \beta)q} \right) y'(\ell)x + \left[ \frac{\beta \lambda}{\rho + \beta \lambda} \right]' \frac{\rho}{\beta + (1 - \beta)q} - \frac{\beta \lambda}{\rho + \beta \lambda} \left( \frac{(1 - \beta)q}{\rho + \beta \lambda + (1 - \beta)q} \right)' \frac{(y - b)x - r'(\ell)}{y'(\ell)x - r'(\ell)}
\]

\[
\to \frac{\beta \lambda}{\rho + \beta \lambda} y'(\ell)x + \left[ \frac{\beta \lambda}{\rho + \beta \lambda} \right]' \frac{y - r'(\ell)}{(1 - \alpha)(1 - u)} y'(\ell)x - (1 - \alpha) y'(\ell) \frac{1}{(1 - \alpha (1 - u))} xy - r'(\ell),
\]
Workers do not take into account that their presence increases unemployment rates, which is more costly in high \( \ell \) locations with higher average worker productivity. Note that they internalize differential impacts through the heterogeneity in firm productivity because the potential match surplus of these workers depends on the productivity of local firms. The planner can address these inefficiencies by using the spatial transfer that exactly captures externalities, \( t'_w(\ell) \), so that workers internalize their impact on the quality of local workforce. Observe that this term equals to \(- \frac{V}{L} \frac{\partial p V^w}{\partial x} x'(\ell)\), which confirms the intuition that externalities arise from the negative impact of workers on local firms, whose value depends on the average productivity of workers in the local market. 

Similarly, I will assess the firm sorting condition. Rearrange the firm sorting condition \( \rho \tilde{V}^w(y(\ell), \ell) = 0 \) and taking the limit with respect to \( \delta_v, b \) and \( \rho \),

\[
\frac{\delta_v}{\rho + \delta_v} \frac{(1 - \beta)q}{\bar{\rho} + \beta \lambda + (1 - \beta)q} x'(y - \frac{(1 - \beta)q}{\bar{\rho} + \beta \lambda + (1 - \beta)q} y'x
\]

\[
+ \frac{\delta_v}{\rho + \delta_v} \left( \frac{(1 - \beta)q}{\bar{\rho} + (1 - \beta)q} \bar{\rho} + \beta \lambda + (1 - \beta)q \right) x'y + \frac{(1 - \beta)q}{\bar{\rho} + (1 - \beta)q} (\bar{\rho} + \beta \lambda + (1 - \beta)q) y'x - c'(\ell)
\]

\[
= \left( \frac{L'}{L} - \frac{V'}{V} \right) \frac{\alpha(1 - \alpha)(1 - u)}{1 - \alpha(1 - u)} \frac{L}{V} x'y + \frac{(1 - \alpha - u)}{1 - \alpha(1 - u)} \frac{L}{V} x'(\ell) y - \frac{\alpha(1 - \alpha)(1 - u)^2}{1 - \alpha(1 - u)} \frac{L}{V} y'x - c'(\ell)
\]

where I use \( \alpha = 1 - \beta, \frac{\rho}{\bar{\rho}} = \left( \frac{V}{V} - \frac{L}{L} \right) \frac{1}{1 - \alpha(1 - u)} \), and \( \frac{\partial}{\partial} = \frac{1}{1 - \alpha(1 - u)} \left( \frac{L'}{L} - \frac{V'}{V} \right) \) for the last line. Observing

\[
- \frac{\alpha(1 - \alpha)(1 - u)^2}{1 - \alpha(1 - u)} = - \frac{(1 - \alpha)(1 - u)}{1 - \alpha(1 - u)} + (1 - u)(1 - \alpha),
\]

the comparison between the above and (A.6) gives the following relation,

\[
\text{planner FOC} = \text{firm FOC} - (1 - \alpha)(1 - u)(\frac{L(\ell)}{V(\ell)}) g'(\ell) x(\ell).
\]

On the one hand, firms do not internalize the fact that local firms in higher \( \ell \) locations are more productive, as are workers. On the other hand, they take into account that the higher average firm productivity in local labor markets increases the threat point of workers in wage bargaining, leading to a decrease in their values. This bargaining channel is merely the transfers between workers and firms, and thus should not be considered from the planner’s perspective. The above shows that the former is always larger than the latter, so on net firms choose higher \( \ell \) than the optimal level with respect to externalities arising from the sorting channel. The planner can correct these externalities by using spatial transfers \( t_f(\ell) \), which are decreasing in \( \ell \).
A.4 Measure-Preserving Constraint

Let \( \tilde{m}(\ell|x) \) be the probability that a type \( x \) worker chooses a location smaller than \( \ell \). For example, under a pure assignment \( x(\ell), \tilde{m}(\ell|x(\ell_0)) = 1\{\ell \geq \ell_0\} \). With this general (non-pure) assignment, I define population density \( L(\ell) \) as below,

\[
\int_{\ell}^{\ell} L(t) \, dt = \int_{x \rightarrow \ell} \tilde{m}(\ell|x) q_w(x) \, dx.
\]

Note that the above condition returns to \( \int_{\ell}^{\ell} L(t) \, dt = \int_{\ell}^{\ell} q(x) \, dx = Q(x(\ell)) \) under PAM allocation. If \( x(\ell) \) is strictly increasing and differentiable as shown in Proposition 1, I obtain \( L(\ell) = M_w q_w(x(\ell)) x'(\ell) \).

In a discrete economy with a finite number of worker types and locations, I can define population density in a conventional way, i.e., a measure of workers per unit of land in each location. I will start with this notion and then show that the above formula can be obtained as a limit.

**Step 1** Consider an economy with a finite number of worker types and location. Consider a finite number of worker types \( \{x_1, \ldots, x_M\} \) with CDF \( Q_w \). Assume that each type has a positive measure, and choose \( x_0 \) which is smaller than \( x_1 \). Then, \( Q_w(x_0) = 0 \).

Consider a finite number of locations \( \{\ell_1, \ldots, \ell_N\} \). Without loss of generality, assume that the land distribution is uniform, i.e., the measure of land in each \( \ell_n \) is given by a number \( d\ell \).\(^{37}\) Consider a weak PAM equilibrium allocation \( \tilde{m}(\ell|x) \). This weak PAM allows multiple types to be in a single location \( \ell \), or a single type of worker \( x_i \) to be in multiple locations. Also, let \( \tilde{m}(\ell_n|x_0) = 1 \) for all \( n \) to simplify the notation.

I will introduce two auxiliary functions, \( \tilde{Q} \) and \( \tilde{x}_n \). First, define a (strictly) increasing function \( \tilde{Q} \) on \([x, \bar{x}]\) such that (1) \( \tilde{Q} = Q_w \) for all \( x_i \), and (2) it is linearly increasing in \((x_{i-1}, x_i)\) for all \( i \). Next, to define an increasing function \( \tilde{x}_n \) on \( n \in \{1, 2, \ldots, N\} \), I first define \( j(n) \equiv \max_j \{x_j|\tilde{m}(\ell_n|x_j) = 1\} \), i.e., the best type among workers who locate only in \( \{\ell_1, \ldots, \ell_n\} \). Using this notation, I define \( \tilde{x}_n = x_{j(n)} + \tilde{m}(\ell_n|x_{j(n)+1})(x_{j(n)+1} - x_{j(n)}) \).

Figure A.1 provides an illustrative example of how the original functions, \( Q_w \) and \( x_n \), and the auxiliary functions, \( \tilde{Q}_w \) and \( \tilde{x}_n \), are related.

The total number of workers from \( \ell_1 \) to \( \ell_n \) is \( \tilde{Q}_w(\tilde{x}_n) \): All worker of types \( x_1, \ldots, x_{j(n)} \) and a fraction \( \tilde{m}(\ell_n|x_{j(n)+1}) \) of \( x_{j(n)+1} \) workers are included. Thus, \( \sum_{k=1}^{n} L(\ell_k) = Q_w(x_{j(n)}) + \tilde{m}(\ell_n|x_{j(n)+1})(Q_w(x_{j(n)+1}) - Q_w(x_{j(n)})) \) = \( \tilde{Q}_w(\tilde{x}_n) \). As a result, population density in location \( \ell_n \) equals

\[
L(\ell) = \frac{\tilde{Q}_w(\tilde{x}_n) - \tilde{Q}_w(\tilde{x}_{n-1})}{\ell_n - \ell_{n-1}} M_w \quad \text{for} \quad \ell \in (\ell_{n-1}, \ell_n],
\]

\(^{37}\) As locations are ex ante homogeneous, the distribution is not identifiable, and the location index can be reformulated so that \( R \) is uniform.
where \( M_w \) is the total measure of workers. The denominator comes from an assumption of uniform land distribution.

**Step 2** Let the number of worker types goes to infinity, and the distribution of workers \( Q_w \) is strictly increasing. Then, \( \tilde{Q}_w = Q_w \) for all \( x \in [x, \bar{x}] \), and moreover, I can characterize the cutoff types \( x(\ell_n) \in [x, \bar{x}] \) such that all workers of \( x < x(\ell_n) \) choose \( \ell \leq \ell_n \), and all others choose \( \ell > \ell_n \). This cutoff should be strictly increasing as each type has 0 measure, and population density \( L(\ell) \) is positive in equilibrium, which implies that \( \tilde{x}_n = x_{j(n)} = x(\ell_n) \). In other words, workers of \( x \in (x(\ell_{n-1}), x(\ell_n)) \) sort into location \( \ell_n \), and workers of a given type choose the same location with probability 1. Note that I can also define \( Q_{n-1}^w \) as \( Q_w \) is strictly increasing by assumption, and thus \( x(\ell_n) = Q_{n-1}^{-1}(\ell_n) \).

Population density becomes

\[
L(\ell) = M_w \frac{Q_w(x(\ell_n)) - Q_w(x(\ell_{n-1}))}{\ell_n - \ell_{n-1}} = \frac{Q_w(x(\ell_n)) - Q_w(x(\ell_{n-1}))}{x(\ell_n) - x(\ell_{n-1})} \frac{x(\ell_n) - x(\ell_{n-1})}{\ell_n - \ell_{n-1}}.
\]

**Step 3** Let the number of locations goes to infinity, and \( \ell \) is uniformly distributed on \( [\ell, \bar{\ell}] \). As \( d\ell = \ell_n - \ell_{n-1} \) converges to zero, \( x(\ell_n) - x(\ell_{n-1}) = Q_{n-1}^{-1}(\ell_n) - Q_{n-1}^{-1}(\ell_{n-1}) \to 0 \) by the continuity of \( Q_w \). From the above equation, two fractions become derivatives, and I obtain the following population density in the limit,

\[
L(\ell) = M_w q_{iw}(x(\ell))x'(\ell),
\]

which coincides with the definition that I use in the continuous economy.

### A.5 Competitive Local Labor Markets: Proof of Proposition 3

In this section, I assume that there is no search friction and that each local labor market is competitive. I first show that workers and firms positively sort across space. I focus on the pure assignment represented by \( x(\ell) \) and \( y(\ell) \).

Workers of productivity \( x \) choose location \( \ell \) that maximizes \( w(x, \ell) - \bar{r}(\ell) \). Firms of productivity \( y \) choose location \( \ell \) that maximizes profits, \( \pi(y, \ell) = x(\ell)y - w(x(\ell), \ell) - c(\ell) \). Consider two locations, \( \ell \) and \( \ell' \). The location
choice of firms implies that $\pi(y(\ell), \ell') \geq \pi(y(\ell'), \ell)$ and $\pi(y(\ell), \ell) \geq \pi(y(\ell), \ell')$. Combining two inequalities, I obtain
\[
x(\ell')(y(\ell') - y(\ell)) \geq x(\ell)(y(\ell') - y(\ell)).
\]
Thus, $y(\ell') > y(\ell)$ implies $x(\ell') > x(\ell)$, implying PAM between workers and firms.

I will focus on the case the total measures of workers and firms are the same, i.e., $M_w = M_f$. First, the measure of workers should be equal to the measure of firms in each $\ell$ in equilibrium. As before, denote the measure of workers and firms in location $\ell$ by $L(\ell)$ and $V(\ell)$, respectively. To show by contradiction, assume that there exists location $\ell$ such that $L(\ell) > V(\ell)$, then, there must be another region $\ell'$ such that $L(\ell') < V(\ell')$. If $L(\ell) < L(\ell')$, $V(\ell')$ is larger than $V(\ell)$, and unmatched firms in $\ell'$ deviate to $\ell$ with lower costs $c(\ell)$, where they can also potentially hire workers and earn positive profits. Contrarily, when $L(\ell) > L(\ell')$, unmatched workers in $\ell$ deviate to $\ell'$ with lower rents $r(\ell')$ where they can also earn wages.

For each local labor market to be cleared, given location choices of workers and firms, it is optimal for firms of $y(\ell)$ to hire $x(\ell)$, i.e.,
\[
\frac{\partial}{\partial x}(xy(\ell) - w(x, \ell)) = 0 \Rightarrow y(\ell) = \frac{\partial w(x(\ell), \ell)}{\partial x}.
\]  
Also, the firm sorting conditions give,
\[
0 = \frac{\partial x(\ell)}{\partial \ell} - \frac{\partial w(x, \ell)}{\partial \ell} \frac{\partial x(\ell)}{\partial \ell} + \frac{\partial w(x, \ell)}{\partial \ell} = y(\ell) + \frac{\partial x(\ell)}{\partial \ell} - c'(\ell) = -\frac{\partial x(\ell)}{\partial \ell} - c'(\ell)
\]
where I use (A.9) and the worker sorting condition, $\frac{\partial w(x(\ell), \ell)}{\partial \ell} = \tilde{h}r'(\ell)$, in the second line. As $L(\ell) = V(\ell)$, in equilibrium, the signs of $r'(\ell)$ and $c'(\ell)$ should be equal, and thus $r'(\ell)$ should be zero for all $\ell$. This implies that $L(\ell)$ is the same across locations, i.e., population density is uniform across locations.

An equilibrium wage of a worker of productivity $x$ is given by
\[
w(x(\ell), \ell) = w(x(\ell), \ell) + \int_\ell^{\ell'} \left( \frac{\partial w(x, \ell)}{\partial x} \frac{\partial x(\ell)}{\partial \ell} + \frac{\partial w(x, \ell)}{\partial \ell} \right) \, d\ell,
\]
\[
= w(x(\ell), \ell) + \int_x^{x(\ell)} y(Q^{-1}_w(x)) \, dx,
\]
where I use (A.9) and the worker sorting condition for the second line, along with the change of variable $x'(\ell) \, d\ell = dx$. This wage formula is exactly the same as the wage function of the economy where there is only a single integrated labor market. The presence of segregated local labor markets does not affect equilibrium matching, wages, and profits. Given this observation, it is clear that the equilibrium is efficient.
Finally, an equilibrium wage $w(x, \ell)$ is unique, and it does not vary across $\ell$. For a location $\ell$ to be the optimal choice for a worker of $x(\ell)$ and a firm of $y(\ell)$,
\[
    w(x(\ell), \ell) - r(\ell) \geq w(x(\ell), \ell') - r(\ell') \Rightarrow w(x(\ell), \ell) \geq w(x(\ell), \ell') \quad \forall \ell',
\]
\[
x(\ell)y(\ell) - w(x(\ell), \ell) - c(\ell) \geq x(\ell)y(\ell) - w(x(\ell), \ell') - c(\ell') \Rightarrow w(x(\ell), \ell) \leq w(x(\ell), \ell') \quad \forall \ell'.
\]
Thus, $w(x(\ell), \ell) = w(x(\ell), \ell')$ for all $\ell, \ell'$.

### A.6 Local Labor Market with Directed Search

In this section, I consider the directed search model: There exist search frictions, but search is competitive (e.g., Moen, 1997). In each local labor market, workers and firms engage in directed (competitive) search following Eeckhout and Kircher (2010). The only difference from their model is that, workers and firms first make location choices, and then engage in directed search in each local labor market. Their location choices first endogenously determine the distribution of workers and firms for each location $\ell$. There are congestion costs in the housing and business services markets, which they pay when choosing locations but before participating in local labor markets.

I focus on pure assignment, $(x(\ell), y(\ell))$. The values of workers of productivity $x$ and firms of productivity $y$ from local labor market are given by\(^{38}\)
\[
    V^u(x, \ell) = \max \lambda(\theta) w, \\
    V^v(y, \ell) = \max q(\theta)(f(x, y) - w),
\]

where $\lambda(\theta)$ is job arrival rate, $w$ is a wage, $q(\theta)$ is vacancy contact rate, and $f(x, y)$ is output. I use a general output function to ensure that I obtain PAM equilibrium without imposing a restriction on the matching elasticity. I will show below the condition under which PAM arises. Alternatively, I can assume $f(x, y) = xy$ and impose a more restrictive assumption on the matching function. In location $\ell$, workers of productivity $x$ optimally choose $\theta(x, \ell)$ subject to $V^v(\ell) = q(\ell)(f(x, y(\ell)) - w(x, y(\ell), \ell))$, where $V^v(\ell) \equiv V^v(y(\ell), \ell)$. When search is competitive, workers must ensure that firms in market $\ell$ enjoy their value $V^v(\ell)$ for making firms hire them. Plugging in $w(x, y(\ell), \ell) = f(x, y(\ell)) - V^v(\ell)/q(\theta(x, \ell))$,
\[
    V^w(x, y, \theta, \ell) = \lambda(\theta(x, \ell)) f(x, y(\ell)) - \theta(x, \ell)V^v(\ell),
\]

and the first order condition with respect to the market tightness is $\lambda'(\theta(x, \ell)) f(x, y(\ell)) = V^v(\ell)$. Similarly, in location $\ell$, firms of productivity $y$ optimally chooses the market tightness subject to $V^w(\ell) = \lambda(\theta(y, \ell)) w(x(\ell), y, \ell)$

\(^{38}\)Details of the model can be found in Eeckhout and Kircher (2010).
where \( U(\ell) \equiv V^u(x(\ell), \ell) \).

\[
\max_{\theta} q(\theta) \left( f(x(\ell), y) - \frac{V^u(\ell)}{\lambda(\theta(y, \ell))} \right),
\]

and the first order condition with respect to the market tightness equals \( q'(\theta(y, \ell)) f(x(\ell), y) + \frac{1}{\theta(y, \ell)^2} V^u(\ell) = 0 \).

The worker (firm, respectively) value of choosing location \( \ell \), \( V^u(x, \ell) \) (\( V^v(y, \ell) \), respectively), is the sum of the value from the local labor market minus housing rents (overhead costs, respectively).

\[
\bar{V}^u(x, \ell) = \lambda(\theta(x, \ell)) f(x, y(\ell)) - \theta(x, \ell) V^v(\ell) - r(\ell) \quad \text{s.t. } \lambda'(\theta(x, \ell)) f(x, y(\ell)) = V^v(\ell),
\]

\[
\bar{V}^v(y, \ell) = q(\theta(y, \ell)) \left( f(x(\ell), y) - \frac{V^u(\ell)}{\lambda(\theta(y, \ell))} \right) - c(\ell) \quad \text{s.t. } \theta(y, \ell)^2 q'(\theta(y, \ell)) f(x(\ell), y) + V^u(\ell) = 0.
\]

From the first order condition of the market tightness, I obtain \( \theta(\ell) V^v(\ell) + V^u(\ell) = \lambda(\ell) f(x(\ell), y(\ell)) \). Differentiating both sides with respect to \( \ell \),

\[
\theta'(\ell) V^v(\ell) - \lambda'(\ell) \theta'(\ell) f(\ell) = \lambda(\ell) f(x' x'(\ell) + f_y y'(\ell)) - \theta(\ell) (V^v)'(\ell) - V^u(\ell). \quad \text{(A.10)}
\]

The worker and firm sorting conditions are given by

\[
r'(\ell) = \lambda(\theta(\ell)) f_y(x(\ell), y(\ell)) y'(\ell) - \theta(\ell) (V^v)'(\ell),
\]

\[
\theta(\ell) c'(\ell) = \lambda(\theta(\ell)) f_x(x(\ell), y(\ell)) x'(\ell) - (V^u)'(\ell).
\]

Summing over the two,

\[
r'(\ell) + \theta c'(\ell) = \lambda(\theta(\ell)) (f_x x' + f_y y') - (\theta(\ell) (V^v)'(\ell) + (V^u)'(\ell)) = \theta'(\ell) (V^v(\ell) - \lambda'(\ell) f(\ell)) = 0,
\]

where the second equality uses (A.10), and the third equality uses the worker’s FOC of \( \theta(x, \ell) \). The above equality implies that \( L'(\ell) V^v(\ell) \leq 0 \), and I conclude that workers and firms do not concentrate in certain regions together.

Next, I characterize the condition under which the equilibrium exhibits PAM between workers and firms. Assuming that \( x(\ell) \) is increasing without loss, PAM arises if and only if \( \bar{V}^u_{x\ell} > 0 \) and \( \bar{V}^u_{y\ell} > 0 \). Guess \( y'(\ell) \). Then, \((V^v)'(\ell) = q(\ell) f_y y'(\ell) \) by the envelope theorem, and \( \theta_x(x, \ell) \lambda''(\theta) f + \lambda'(\theta) f_x = 0 \) by differentiating the worker’s FOC of \( \theta(x, \ell) \) w.r.t. \( x \). Plugging these two,

\[
\bar{V}^u_{x\ell} = \theta_x(x, \ell) (\lambda'(\theta) f_y y'(\ell) - (V^v)'(\ell)) + \lambda f_{xy} y'(\ell) = y'(\ell) \lambda \left( f_{xy} - \frac{\theta q'(\theta) \lambda'(\theta)}{\lambda''(\theta) \lambda f} f_x f_y \right),
\]

which is positive if

\[
\frac{f_{xy} f_x}{f_y f_y} \geq \sup_{\theta} \frac{\lambda'(\theta) \theta q'(\theta)}{\lambda''(\theta) \lambda f}.
\]
Following the similar process,

\[
V_{y/\ell}^w = \frac{\partial \theta(y, \ell)}{\partial y} \left( q'(\theta) f_x x'(\ell) + \frac{1}{\theta^2} (V^w)'(\ell) \right) + q(\theta) f_{xy} x'(\ell) \\
= \left( \theta - \frac{\partial q'(\theta)}{\partial f_x} \right) q(\theta) f_{xy} x'(\ell) + f_{xy} x'(\ell)
\]

which is positive under the same condition. Under this condition, in equilibrium, \( y(\ell) \) will be (weakly) increasing, and the pure assignment assumption yields a strictly increasing \( y(\ell) \), which verifies the assumption.\(^39\)

I now show that the decentralized equilibrium is efficient. I focus on the output function that leads to PAM equilibrium and the pure assignment.\(^40\) The planner solves

\[
\max \int_0^1 \lambda(\ell) L(\ell) f(x(\ell), y(\ell)) \, d\ell - \int_0^1 \left[ C_r(L(\ell)) + C_v(V(\ell)) \right] \, d\ell,
\]

where \( L(\ell) = M_w q_w'(x(\ell)) x'(\ell), V(\ell) = M_f q_f'(y(\ell)) y'(\ell), \theta(\ell) = V(\ell)/L(\ell) \).

Note that the definition is different from the baseline model as the problem is static under the assumption of Eeckhout and Kircher (2010). Set up the Hamiltonian,

\[
\mathcal{H} = \lambda(\ell) L(\ell) f(x(\ell), y(\ell)) - C_r(L(\ell)) - C_v(V(\ell)) + \mu_w \frac{L(\ell)}{M_w q_w(x(\ell))} + \mu_f \frac{V(\ell)}{M_f q_f(y(\ell))},
\]

which gives the following first order conditions,

\[
0 = -\theta(\ell)^2 q'(\theta) f(x(\ell), y(\ell)) - C'_r(L) + \frac{\mu_w}{M_w q_w(x(\ell))}, \quad (L)
\]

\[
\mu'_w(\ell) = -\lambda(\ell) L(\ell) f_x(x(\ell), y(\ell)) + \frac{\mu_w L(\ell)}{M_w q_w'(x(\ell))} q_w(x(\ell)), \quad (x)
\]

\[
0 = \lambda'(\theta) f(x(\ell), y(\ell)) - C'_v(V) + \frac{\mu_f V(\ell)}{M_f q_f(y(\ell))}, \quad (V)
\]

\[
\mu'_f(\ell) = -\lambda(\ell) L(\ell) f_y(x(\ell), y(\ell)) + \frac{\mu_f V(\ell)}{M_f q_f(y(\ell))} q_f'(y(\ell)). \quad (y)
\]

Differentiate \((L)\) with respect to \( \ell \), and plug in \((x)\), and similarly, differentiate \((V)\) with respect to \( \ell \), and plug in \((y)\),

\[
C''_r(L(\ell)) L'(\ell) = \theta'(\ell) (2\theta q'(\theta) + \theta^2 q''(\theta)) f(\ell) - (\lambda(\theta) + \theta^2 q'(\theta)) f_x x'(\ell) - \theta^2 q'(\theta) f_y y'(\ell),
\]

\[
C''_v(V(\ell)) V'(\ell) = \theta'(\ell) \lambda''(\theta) f + \lambda'(\theta) f_x x'(\ell) + \theta(\ell) q'(\theta) f_y y'(\ell).
\]

To compare these conditions to those in decentralized equilibrium, differentiate the first order conditions of the

\(^{39}\) This condition is identical to Eeckhout and Kircher (2010). Location choice in the first stage does not interact with complementarity in the labor market because congestion costs arising from location choice affect their values additively.

\(^{40}\) In contrast to the baseline model with random matching, pure assignment is no longer optimal. When the planner has a choice of non-pure assignment, the planner assigns workers and firms uniformly and matches workers and firms within each local labor market to minimize congestion costs.
market tightness of workers and firms with respect to $\ell$,

$$
(V^u)'(\ell) = \theta'(\ell)\lambda''(\theta)f + \lambda'(f_x x'(\ell) + f_y y'(\ell)),
$$

$$
-(V^u)'(\ell) = \theta'(\ell)(2\theta q' + \theta^2 q'')f + \theta^2 q'(f_x x'(\ell) + f_y y'(\ell)).
$$

Plug the above to the worker and firm sorting conditions,

$$
r'(\ell) = \lambda f_y y' - \theta'(\ell)\lambda''(\theta)f(\ell) - \ell'(f_x x'(\ell) + f_y y'(\ell))
= -\theta'(\ell)(2\theta q'(\theta) + \theta^2 q'')f - \theta(q + \theta q')f_x x'(\ell) - \theta^2 q'(\theta)f_y y'(\ell),
$$

$$
c'(\ell) = q(\theta(\ell))f_x x'(\ell) - \frac{1}{\theta}(V^u)'(\ell)
= (q + \theta q'(\theta))f_x x'(\ell) + \theta q'(\theta)f_y y'(\ell) + \theta'(\ell)(2q'(\theta) + \theta q''(\theta))f.
$$

These conditions on location choice are identical to those of the planner characterized above. Thus, I conclude that the decentralized equilibrium is efficient. In directed search models, workers (or firms) are constrained to provide the expected value of firms (or workers), and this condition ensures that all externalities are internalized. I confirm that the intuition remains valid even when I introduce the pre-stage where workers and firms choose locations. The following proposition summarizes the result.

**Proposition A.1.** Suppose that complementarity in output is sufficiently large such that (A.11) holds. If a pure assignment equilibrium exists, then the equilibrium exhibits the following properties.

1. **Positive assortative matching (PAM) between workers and firms obtains in space:** Firm productivity $y(\ell)$ increases in $\ell$ just like worker productivity $x(\ell)$.

2. **Workers and firms are not concentrated in space:** $L'(\ell)V'(\ell) \leq 0$.

3. **Decentralized equilibrium is efficient.**

Contrary to Proposition 3, matching between workers and firms differs when labor markets are segmented across locations. Differential housing rents and overhead costs additionally shape location choices of workers and firms, and thus affect their matching. For example, if the cost functions of housing and business services are extremely convex, the equilibrium will have a smaller variation in the market tightness across locations. In contrast, if these functions are linear, the equilibrium will be identical to the one with an integrated labor market.
B. Empirical Evidence of Two-Sided Sorting

B.1 Extended Model

In this section, I extend the model to justify two-way fixed effects estimation and a migration instrument that I use in Section 4. Importantly, this model predicts the same wage equation, and the prediction on the impact of worker sorting on firm sorting remains the same.

Model. I extend the model in several dimensions. I keep focusing on the limit case where $\delta_v$ goes to infinity as in Section 3.2. I introduce migration frictions. Workers, either employed or unemployed, can migrate only when they receive the migration shock at rate $\delta_m$. Receiving this shock, workers first draw preference shocks $\varepsilon \sim F_\varepsilon$ for each location $\ell$, and this location-specific shock $\varepsilon(\ell)$ increases the value of workers multiplicatively of moving to $\ell$. I assume that $F_\varepsilon$ is continuous, and it has a large support so that workers can draw a sufficiently large $\varepsilon(\ell)$ with a positive probability. Workers then decide where to go based on this realization. After migrating, they start searching for a job. They are allowed to choose the current location and stay, but they lose their current jobs if they were employed. With the introduction of preference shocks, a major departure from the baseline is that an equilibrium is no longer characterized by a pure assignment. Workers with low productivity can choose a location populated by productive firms and higher housing rents if the preference shocks are sufficiently large.

I also assume that there are migration costs, $m_{\ell', \ell}$. When a worker moves from $\ell'$ to another location $\ell$, her value is discounted by a discount factor $m_{\ell', \ell}^{-1}$. For example, these costs may arise from the distance between two regions (Schwartz, 1973). It is less costly for workers to migrate to nearby areas, and migration networks are stronger between geographically proximate regions. With these two components, the value of a worker moving from $\ell'$ to $\ell$ equals $\varepsilon(\ell)m_{\ell', \ell}^{-1}$ multiplied by the value of searching for a job in location $\ell$, $V^u(x, \ell)$, which I explain below.

Location decisions. The flow value of unemployed and employed in location $\ell$, excluding preference shocks $\varepsilon(\ell)$ and migration costs $m_{\ell', \ell}$, remains almost the same, but I additionally take into account the migration option value $V^m(x, \ell)$:

$$\rho V^u(x, \ell) = bx + \Pi - \bar{h}\ell + \lambda(\ell)[V^e(x, y(\ell), \ell) - V^u(x, \ell)] + \delta_m[V^m(x, \ell) - V^u(x, \ell)],$$

$$\rho V^e(x, y, \ell) = w(x, y, \ell) + \Pi - \bar{h}\ell + \delta[V^u(x, \ell) - V^e(x, y, \ell)] + \delta_m[V^m(x, \ell) - V^e(x, y, \ell)],$$

where $V^m(x, \ell) = \mathbb{E}[\max_k \{m_{\ell', k}^{-1}\varepsilon(k)V^u(x, k)]$. Defining the match surplus, $S(x, y, \ell) = V^e(x, y, \ell) - V^u(x, \ell) + V^p(x, y, \ell) - V^v(y, \ell)$ as before, the only change from the baseline is that $\hat{\rho} = \rho + \delta$ increases to $\hat{\rho} = \rho + \delta + \delta_m$. The value of firms remains almost the same, but I replace $x(\ell)$ with $\mathbb{E}[x|\ell]$ to account for the fact that the distribution
of worker productivity is non-degenerate. The wage of a match is same as before with modified $\tilde{\rho}$,

$$\log w(x, y, \ell) = \log x + \log \left( b + (1 - \beta) \frac{\beta \lambda(\ell)}{\tilde{\rho} + \beta \lambda(\ell)} (y(\ell) - b) + \beta (y - b) \right). \tag{A.12}$$

It is important to observe that the wage is log additive in worker productivity and the remaining part. This feature will turn out to be useful later for two-way fixed effects estimation.

With some algebra following Appendix A.1, the value of workers and firms become

$$\rho V^w(x, \ell) = bx + \frac{\beta \lambda(\ell)}{\tilde{\rho} + \beta \lambda(\ell)} (y(\ell) - b)x - \bar{h}r(\ell),$$

$$\rho \tilde{V}^v(y, \ell) = (1 - \beta) q(\ell) E[x|\ell] \left( y - b - \frac{\beta \lambda(\ell)}{\tilde{\rho} + \beta \lambda(\ell)} (y(\ell) - b) \right) - c(\ell).$$

Observe that the value of a firm is single-crossing in hiring opportunities $A_f(E[x|\ell], q(\ell)) = q(\ell) E[x|\ell]$ and the productivity of firm $y$. Thus, I have the following prediction.

**Lemma A.1** (Prediction on firm sorting). *If a location $\ell$ suddenly experiences an exogenous increase in worker productivity $E[x|\ell]$, while the vacancy contact rate does not change, then this location will attract more productive firms than before.*

Location decisions of workers are characterized by the probability that a worker of $x$ chooses a location between 0 and $\ell$, $M(\ell|x, \ell')$. Define the corresponding density $m(\ell|x, \ell')$, which exists under the regularity assumption on $F_x$. Note that when the dispersion of preference shocks goes to zero, the location choice can be characterized by a location-matching function, $x(\ell)$, and the decision simplifies to $M(\ell|x, \ell') = 1\{x(\ell) \geq x\}$. In contrast, I do not introduce any frictions to location decisions of firms, thus the firm sorting remains pure, and thus can be characterized by a function $y(\ell)$.

**Migration network.** Location decisions of workers $M(\ell|x, \ell')$ and their productivity distribution $Q_w(x)$ together determine the distribution of workers across locations. Let $\mu_\ell(x)$ be the measure of workers who have productivity $x$ and choose $\ell$. Then, this measure satisfies the following law of motions,

$$\dot{\mu}_\ell(x) = -\delta_m \mu_\ell(x) + \int_{\ell'} \delta_m \mu_{\ell'}(x) m(\ell|x, \ell') \, d\ell'.$$

For example, if $m_{\ell', \ell} = 1$, it is clear that $m(\ell|x, \ell')$ becomes independent of $\ell'$ and simplifies to $m(\ell|x)$. Then, I obtain $\mu_\ell(x) = m(\ell|x) M_w q_w(x)$ due to the measure-preserving constraint $M_w q_w(x) = \int_x \mu_\ell(x) \, dx$. Population density of $\ell$ is given by

$$\int_0^\ell L(k) \, dk = \int_0^\ell \int_x \mu_\ell(x) \, dx \, dk \Rightarrow L(\ell) = \int_x \mu_\ell(x) \, dx.$$
Note that the above definition of population density returns to \( \int L(k) \, dk = \int 1\{x(\ell) \geq x\} q_w(x) \, dx = \int q_w(x) \, dx = Q_w(x(\ell)) \) if the assignment is pure.

I now examine the migration network, which is crucial information for constructing an instrument. The characterization below shows that different pairs of locations can have different magnitudes of migration flows. Moreover, it shows how changes in the number of out-migrants and their productivity from an origin ‘\( \ell' \) affect the average productivity of incoming migrants, which implies that my instrument in (12) will be highly correlated with the observed changes in migrant productivity.

Due to the preference shocks \( \varepsilon(\ell) \), there will be positive flows between locations. This migration network can be characterized by the location choice probability and the measure of workers. The probability that workers are from \( \ell' \) conditional on arriving at \( \ell \), \( \Pr(\ell' \to \ell | \ell) \), are given by

\[
\Pr(\ell' \to \ell | \ell) = \frac{\int_{x} m(\ell|x, \ell') \mu_{\ell'}(x) \, dx}{\int_{x} m(\ell, \ell') \mu_{\ell}(x) \, dx \, dk}.
\]

The intensity of migration flows between a pair of two regions can differ due to the migration costs \( m_{\ell, \ell} \). If \( m_{\ell, \ell} \) is smaller, then more workers from \( \ell' \) will move to \( \ell \). Also, observe that if a larger measure of workers from origin \( \ell' \) choose to leave their location, \( m(\ell|x, \ell') \) increases, leading to an increase in \( \Pr(\ell' \to \ell | \ell) \). This shows how an increase in out-migrants \( O_{\ell' - \ell, \ell} \) leads to an increase in share of migrants from \( \ell' \).

The average productivity of migrants in \( \ell \) is given by

\[
\mathbb{E}[x|\ell, \text{migrant}] = \int_{x} \Pr(\ell' \to \ell | \ell) \mathbb{E}[x|\ell' \to \ell] \, dx \quad \text{where} \quad \mathbb{E}[x|\ell' \to \ell] = \int_{x} \frac{m(\ell|x, \ell') \mu_{\ell'}(x)}{\int_{x'} m(\ell'|x', \ell) \mu_{\ell}(x') \, dx'} \, dx \, dx',
\]

and the average productivity of non-migrants is the same in steady state. Workers from \( \ell' \) tend to be more productive, if the average productivity of workers in \( \ell' \), \( \mathbb{E}[x|\ell'] \), is higher.

### B.2 Estimation of Worker and Firm Productivity

**Estimating parameters.** I can recover the productivity of firms \( y(\ell) \) in two steps. First, I can directly estimate the local job finding rate \( \lambda(\ell) \) and calibrate \( \hat{\beta} \), which is the sum of discount rate and separation rate. Next, I estimate two unknown parameters—worker’s bargaining power \( \beta \) and an unemployment benefit \( b \)—by targeting two moments—the replacement rate and aggregate labor share. Given these parameters, computing \( y(\ell) \) from (10) is straightforward, which then allows me to compute two implied corresponding moments using worker and firm productivity and estimated fixed effects. Importantly, this estimation strategy recovers productivity independently of the other parameters of the model.

---

\(^{41}\) In addition, it can also depend on the composition \( \mu_{\ell}(x) \). For example, the fraction of workers moving to \( \ell \) conditional on leaving \( \ell' \), \( \Pr(\ell' \to \ell | \ell) \), is higher if the composition of workers is biased toward types \( x \) with higher values in region \( \ell \). In the model, this is the case when \( |\ell - \ell'| \) is smaller, controlling for migration costs.
The average unemployment benefit of unemployed workers equals $b$ multiplied by average worker productivity, which is simply the average of worker fixed effects. Wage equals worker productivity multiplied by firm fixed effects, and its average can be computed from the panel data. The replacement rate is the ratio between the two, and I target 0.6 following the out-of-work dataset provided in the Social Policy Indicator (SPIN) database. Expressing replacement rate as a function of observable variables,

$$\text{Replacement rate} = \frac{\mathbb{E}[bx]}{\mathbb{E}[w(x, y, \ell)\,|\,\text{employed}]} = \frac{b\mathbb{E}[\hat{x}]}{\mathbb{E}[\hat{x}\hat{y}\,|\,\text{employed}]};$$

which pins down $b = 0.65$. Focusing on the newly created jobs that determine the option value, under the pure assignment of firms, the productivity can be expressed as below,

$$y(\ell) = \frac{\hat{\rho} + \beta \lambda(\ell)}{\beta(\hat{\rho} + \lambda(\ell))}\hat{y}(\ell) - b\frac{\hat{\rho}(1 - \beta)}{\beta(\hat{\rho} + \lambda(\ell))}.$$

For a given value of the bargaining power $\beta$, I can compute the firm productivity and thus the labor share as below,

$$\text{Labor share} = \frac{\mathbb{E}[w(x, y, \ell)]}{\mathbb{E}[xy]} = \frac{\mathbb{E}[\hat{x}\hat{y}]}{\mathbb{E}[\hat{x}y]}.$$

The labor share increases in $\beta$ because output decreases in $\beta$ for given fixed effects $\hat{y}(\ell)$. I find that $\beta = 0.068$ gives the labor share of 0.63 (FRED, 2017).

**Estimation results.** The dispersion of local productivity of both workers and firms is substantial. The standard deviations of local averages of log productivity are 0.06 and 0.12 for workers and firms, respectively. Higher firm fixed effects indicate higher firm productivity, with a correlation of 0.96. The discrepancy between the two arises from differences in job arrival rates, which lead to differential bargaining threat points of workers.

**Descriptive evidence on spatial disparities.** Using these estimated productivity, I show that the data is qualitatively consistent with the predictions made in Proposition 1. The left panel of Figure A.2 shows a bincatter plot of worker and firm productivity across regions. Worker and firm productivity are positively correlated across regions, consistent with the first property, i.e., PAM between workers and firms across locations. A 10% increase in worker productivity is associated with an 12% increase firm productivity across space.

The right panel of Figure A.2 displays a bincatter of productivity and average wages against log population density. The results support the second and third properties of Proposition 1, showing that denser locations have higher average productivity and wages. The fitted lines for log productivity of workers, firms, and wages have slopes of 0.042, 0.075, and 0.072, respectively.

---

42 The positive correlation between their productivities in Germany is also documented in Card et al. (2018) and Dauth et al. (2022), but they focus on estimated fixed effects.
Figure A.2. Average Productivity of Workers and Firms in Space

Notes: Data source: LIAB (2003-2016). I compute the local average of the log productivity of employed workers and their firms, as well as the log wage.

B.3 Additional Results

I provide two additional results that complement the findings in Section 4. First, I regress changes in estimated firm fixed effects of new jobs, $\Delta \log \hat{y}^{\ell}$, as opposed to changes in recovered firm productivity. The results are presented in Table A.1, with each column following the same specification to that in Table 1. Focusing on the preferred specification in Column (5), a 1 standard deviation increase in the quality of the local workforce results in a 0.6 standard deviation increase in firm productivity in the same location. This finding aligns with the conclusion in Table 1, which suggests that the estimation results are robust.\(^{43,44}\)

For a second robustness check, I also regress changes in estimated firm fixed effects of existing jobs, $\Delta \log \hat{y}^{old}(\ell)$, created in the first period.\(^{45}\) If a rise in the quality of the local workforce equally increases both new and existing jobs, it indicates that the productivity growth is primarily driven by region-specific factors. I present the results in Table A.2, following the same specifications but omitting Column (5) as it is not applicable in this context. None of the coefficients are statistically significant, and all are near zero. The stark contrast between the coefficients in Table A.1 and those in Table A.2 suggests that the sorting mechanism is mainly responsible for the positive effect resulting from a rise in worker productivity. Taking a step further, the coefficients being close

---

\(^{43}\) As I control for changes in the job finding rate, changes in firm fixed effects can be attributed to changes in firm productivity. To measure the dispersion of estimated firm fixed effects arising from firm productivity, I compute the standard deviation of residualized firm fixed effects.

\(^{44}\) I obtain a similar result using relative changes in estimated firm fixed effects of new jobs compared with those of existing jobs, i.e., $\Delta \log \hat{y}^{\ell} - \Delta \log \hat{y}^{old}$, as the dependent variable, instead of adding $\Delta \log \hat{y}^{old}(\ell)$ as a control. It is reassuring that the coefficient decreases only to 0.632 (s.e. 0.238).

\(^{45}\) I use estimated firm fixed effects of existing jobs, instead of their recovered productivity. As shown in (A.12), the productivity of existing jobs is negatively correlated with the productivity of new jobs $y(\ell)$ for given firm fixed effects. Thus, I focus on estimated firm fixed effects which do not rely on my wage equation and the estimated parameter values. This does not pose a concern when I focus on new jobs as in Table 1.
Table A.1: Changes in Local Firm Fixed Effects

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
<th>(5)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>OLS</td>
<td>IV</td>
<td>IV</td>
<td>IV</td>
<td>IV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Delta \log x(\ell)$</td>
<td>0.449</td>
<td>0.834</td>
<td>0.765</td>
<td>0.797</td>
<td>0.766</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.090)</td>
<td>(0.269)</td>
<td>(0.219)</td>
<td>(0.501)</td>
<td>(0.233)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Delta \log \hat{y}^\text{old}(\ell)$</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.438</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.136)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2SLS First-stage Estimates</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Delta \log x^{\text{IV}}(\ell)$</td>
<td>0.606</td>
<td>0.619</td>
<td>0.677</td>
<td>0.604</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.185)</td>
<td>(0.181)</td>
<td>(0.342)</td>
<td>(0.183)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: $N = 257$. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. Each observation is weighted by the number of employees. The dependent variable is the change in firm fixed effects of new jobs. In the first-stage regression, I regress the change in worker productivity on its instrument and the controls I include in the second-stage.

to zero indicate that instrumented changes in worker productivity are not correlated with region-specific shocks, thereby confirming the validity of my instrument.

C. Quantitative Analysis

C.1 Data

Locations. I base my analysis on metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs). Population density of the year 2010 across MSAs is obtained from the Census data. It is well known that population density across MSAs remains relatively stable over time.

Wages. I use incwage (nominal, wage and salary income) provided by the ACS from IPUMS Ruggles et al. (2023) for the year 2017. I retain workers between the ages of 26 and 59 and exclude individuals employed in military occupations. I use sampling weights (perwt) to account for the survey sampling design. I first residualize log nominal wages controlling for age, sex, race (4 groups), and 1-digit industry (5 groups). I do not control for occupation as it is not an inherent characteristic of individuals. Then, I compute the local average wages using the residualized values.

Housing markets. I run a hedonic regression of log housing rents on attributes of buildings (number of rooms, built year, the number of housing units in the structure) to compute the residualized housing rents from ACS (2017) for each individual and compute the average. I compute the local average housing share using raw labor.
Table A.2: Changes in Local Firm Fixed Effects of Existing Jobs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OLS</td>
<td>0.012</td>
<td>0.155</td>
<td>0.094</td>
<td>-0.027</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>0.040</td>
<td>0.132</td>
<td>0.128</td>
<td>0.195</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2SLS First-stage Estimates</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>∆ log (x(\ell)) IV</td>
<td>0.606</td>
<td>0.619</td>
<td>0.677</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.185)</td>
<td>(0.181)</td>
<td>(0.342)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: \(N = 257\). Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. Each observation is weighted by the number of employees. The dependent variable is the change in firm fixed effects of existing jobs. In the first-stage regression, I regress the change in worker productivity on its instrument and the controls I include in the second-stage.

income and rents. Next, I target the average spending shares on housing in the total consumption expenditure of 33% (Consumer Expenditure Survey, 2017).

**Federal income tax.** From the March CPS, I compute the average tax rates for each MSA (2017, 2019). The Tax Cuts and Job Acts was passed at the end of December in 2017, with most of the changes taking effect in January 2018. Thus, I compare tax rates for the year 2017 and 2019 using adjusted gross income (\(adjginc\)) and federal income taxation (\(fedtaxac\)) in the CPS from IPUMS, which are calculated by the Census Bureau’s tax model and added to the data. I regress the log disposable income rates, i.e., after-tax income over income, on the log population density, to project the tax rates on locations to understand their impact on spatial disparities. A more commonly used approach is to regress the log disposable income rates on the log income (e.g., Heathcote, Storesletten and Violante, 2017). The estimates for the year 2017 are \(\log(\text{disp. income rates}) = -0.072 - 0.0061 \log(\text{pop. density})\). When I estimate the same regression for the year 2019, to avoid any distortions caused by changes in the wage distribution, I first approximate the log after-tax income in 2019 as a function of the log of income. I then predict the after-tax income for each individual using these estimates and the income in 2017. Using this predicted after-tax income of the year 2017 under the 2019 tax rates, the regression yields \(\log(\text{disp. income rates}) = -0.071 - 0.0026 \log(\text{pop. density})\).

### C.2 Quantitative Model

I now present changes in the model after several modifications that I make in Section 5.1.
Values. With Stone-Geary utility function, income taxes, and housing regulations, the value of unemployed and employed workers change to

\[ \rho V^u(x, \ell) = r(\ell)\omega((1 - \tau_w(\ell))bx - \bar{h}r(\ell) + \Pi + T_r(\ell)) + \lambda(\ell)(V^c(x, y, \ell) - V^u(x, \ell)), \]

\[ \rho V^e(x, y, \ell) = r(\ell)\omega((1 - \tau_w(\ell))w(x, y, \ell) - \bar{h}r(\ell) + \Pi + T_r(\ell)) + \delta(V^u(x, \ell) - V^e(x, y, \ell)), \]

while the value of firms remains the same.

Rubinstein bargaining and wages. I discuss the bargaining solution when workers have a Stone-Geary utility function and workers pay income taxes as assumed in Section 5. I show that the solution still has a simple solution with a slight modification.

Consider a parallel time for bargaining where a flow surplus of firms (workers, respectively) is \( v_f = \hat{\rho}(V^p(x, y, \ell) - V^e(y, \ell)) \) \( v_w = \hat{\rho}(V^c(x, y, \ell) - V^u(x, \ell)) \), respectively. A worker with a discount factor \( \delta_w \) and a firm with a discount factor \( \delta_f \) are involved in a bargaining game where a firm is the first mover. I will check four assumptions to apply proposition 122.1 in Osborne and Rubinstein (1994). It is straightforward to check that the bargaining problem satisfies the first three assumptions (no redundancy, the indifference when the opponent enjoys the best agreement, monotone Pareto frontier) when workers discount their value by \( r^{-\omega}(1 - \tau_w) \). The final assumption is satisfied if the Pareto frontier of the set of agreements is the set of \( \{v \in \mathbb{R}^2 : v_w = g(v_f) \} \) for some decreasing concave function \( g \), and the preference of each player is represented by \( \delta_i v_i \) for some \( 0 < \delta_i < 1 \) for \( i = w, f \). In my context, \( v_f = A - w \) and \( v_w = B + r(\ell)\omega(1 - \tau(w))w \) where \( A = xy - q(V^p - V^u) - \delta_e V^e \) and \( B = -r^{-\omega}bx - \lambda(V^c - V^u) \). It is clear that \( g(v_f) = B + r(\ell)\omega(1 - \tau_w)(A - v_f) \) is decreasing and weakly concave. Thus, from the proposition, a subgame perfect equilibrium is characterized by \( v_f^* \) and \( v_w^* \) such that \( \delta_f v_f^* = v_f^* \) and \( g(v_w^*) = \delta_w g(v_f^*) \). Applying this result, setting \( \beta = \frac{1-\delta_f}{1-\delta_f \delta_w} \) leads to

\[ v_f = (1 - \beta)(xy - bx - r(\ell)\omega\lambda(\ell)(V^c - V^u) - q(\ell)(V^p - V^c) + \delta_e V^e), \]

\[ v_w = r^{-\omega}(1 - \tau_w)\beta(xy - bx - r(\ell)\omega\lambda(\ell)(V^c - V^u) - q(\ell)(V^p - V^c) + \delta_e V^e). \]

The outcome is equivalent to the solution of the Nash bargaining in which workers and firms split the adjusted surplus \( S = r^\omega(1 - \tau_w)^{-1}(V^c - V^u) + V^p - V^e \) with worker’s bargaining power \( \beta \).

Housing markets. I assume that total cost of providing housing \( H(\ell) \) is \( C_r(H(\ell)) = \frac{1}{(1+\gamma)H_w}H(\ell)^{1+\gamma} \), where \( \gamma = 1/\eta_w \) is an inverse of the housing supply elasticity \( \eta_w \), i.e., a price elasticity. Because the housing market is competitive, housing rents \( r(\ell) \) equal the marginal cost \( (H(\ell)/H_w)^\gamma \), and the housing supply \( H_w(r(\ell)) \) equals \( H_w r(\ell)^{\omega_w} \).
Saiz (2010) finds that more stringent regulations reduce housing supply elasticity $\eta_w$. He first estimates the price elasticity $\gamma(\ell)$ across MSAs and regresses estimated elasticities on the local regulation index, WRI($\ell$),

$$
\gamma(\ell) = \gamma + 0.28 \log(3 + \text{WRI}(\ell)) + \Gamma \gamma X_\gamma(\ell) + \varepsilon(\ell).
$$

(A.13)

I microfound the above relation by introducing taxes on housing production. Suppose the government imposes taxes on housing production. Specifically, I assume that the tax rate $\tau(H)$ depends on the total housing supply,

$$
\tau(H; \ell) = (H/T)^{t_h(\ell)} - 1.
$$

Here, the term $t_h(\ell)$ quantifies the stringency of housing regulations. The sum of production costs and taxes of housing supply becomes $(1 + \tau(H; \ell))C_r(H(\ell)) = \frac{1}{1 + \gamma + t_h(\ell)} H^{1+\gamma+t_h(\ell)} w(\ell) H/T$, and housing rents become

$$
r(H, \ell) = \frac{1 + \gamma + t_h(\ell)}{1 + \gamma} \left( \frac{H}{H_w} \right)^\gamma \left( \frac{H^{t_h(\ell)}}{T} \right).
$$

(A.14)

First, observe that this functional form is consistent with (A.13). The elasticity of housing rents $r(\ell)$ with respect to housing supply $H$ is $\gamma + t_h(\ell)$, and more stringent regulations (i.e., higher $t_h(\ell)$) lead to a higher price elasticity or a smaller housing elasticity, $\eta_w(\ell) = 1/(\gamma + t_h(\ell))$. I normalize tax rates so that $\min_{\tau} t_h(\ell)$ and $\min_{\tau} \tau(H; \ell)$ are zero. In other words, $t_h(\ell) = 0.28[\log(3 + \text{WRI}(\ell)) - \log(3 + \text{WRI}(\ell))]$. The housing supply becomes

$$
H_w(r(\ell); t_h(\ell)) = \left( \frac{1 + \gamma}{1 + \gamma + t_h(\ell)} \right)^{\frac{1}{1+t_h(\ell)}} \left( H_w T^{t_h(\ell)} \right)^{\frac{1}{1+t_h(\ell)}} r(\ell)^{-\frac{1}{1+t_h(\ell)}}.
$$

Finally, housing rents are pinned down by the housing market clearing condition,

$$
r(\ell)H_w(r(\ell), \ell) = (1 - \omega)\bar{h} L(\ell) + \omega((-1 + \eta_w(\ell))(u(\ell)b(x(\ell) + (1 - u(\ell))w(x(\ell), g(\ell), \ell)) + \Pi + T_r(\ell)L(\ell)),
$$

(A.15)

where $H_w(r(\ell), \ell)$ is implicitly determined by (A.14) and $T_r(\ell)$ is the local tax revenue per capita.

**Business services market.** Assuming the same functional form for the cost function of business services as in housing, $C_v(S(\ell)) = S(\ell)^{1 + 1/\eta_f} H_f^{1/\eta_f}$, profits of intermediaries are given by

$$
\pi_v(N(\ell)) = c(\ell) N(\ell) - C_v(N(\ell)) = c(\ell) N(\ell)/(1 + \eta_f),
$$

where I impose the market clearing assumption, $S(\ell) = N(\ell)$, for the second equality.

---

46 I include a parameter $T$ so that tax rates $1 + \tau$ become unit free by appropriately choosing $T$ based on the unit of housing. Moreover, the term $H/T$ being larger than 1 for all $\ell$ guarantees that housing rents $r(\ell)$ are increasing in tax rates $\tau u_h(\ell)$. 

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Figure A.3. Model Fit: Population Density and Unemployment Rates

Figure A.4. Non-Targeted Moment: log GDP per capita

Free entry. Firms freely enter until the expected profits become zero,

$$\int \max_{\ell} V^p(y, \ell) dQ_f(y) = c_e.$$  

C.3 Model Fit

In addition to moments presented in Table 3, I also target population density and unemployment rates across locations. Figure A.3 shows the fit of these two sets of moments. In Figure A.4, I present the fit of log GDP per capita, which is non-targeted.
D. Policy Evaluation

D.1 Federal Income Tax

Figure A.5 shows the value change of unemployed workers of each percentile. The changes in the value of employed workers looks qualitatively the same. The heterogeneous impact resulting from differential changes in tax rates is mitigated by increased housing rents and decreased market tightness in high-ℓ regions resulting from substantial inflows of workers. Changes in welfare due to firm productivity are negligible for all workers. Even though workers move to different local labor markets, the corresponding relocation of firms in the new equilibrium leads to limited changes in firm productivity for each individual.

In the right panel of Figure A.5, I plot the welfare changes of workers in the one-sided sorting model. The key difference from the left panel is that all workers gain from higher local TFP as they relocate towards more productive regions.

D.2 Housing Regulation

In this section, I evaluate the effect of housing regulations that differ across regions in the U.S. Hsieh and Moretti (2019) claim that relaxing housing regulations in major cities attracts numerous workers into these productive regions, leading to a substantial increase in GDP. They assess the aggregate effect of land use restrictions by examining the counterfactual where they assume land use regulations are equal to the level of regulations in the
median city. They conclude that relaxing restrictions in large cities (New York, San Jose, San Francisco) to the median US city would dramatically increase GDP (also increase welfare growth rates between 1964–2009).

To implement the similar counterfactual exercise, I relax the housing regulations in dense areas $\ell \in [0.9, 1]$ where approximately 10% of workers reside. Specifically, I assume that these cities choose the same tax schedule $\tau(H; \ell)$ to that of the median location $\ell = 0.5$. Figure A.6 shows the baseline and counterfactual housing elasticities. The housing market becomes more elastic, particularly for high-$\ell$ regions.

Workers and firms move toward large cities where the regulations are relaxed. Population density and the measure of vacancies in the top 10% regions increase by 55.6% and 55.6%, respectively. Yet, housing rents in dense regions are lower due to the relaxed regulations, as shown in the right panel of Figure A.7. As workers in less dense areas relocate to denser cities, other locations become less dense. In particular, the relocation of workers who are productive but not highly productive enough to make it to the densest regions causes a sharp decline in population density in moderately crowded neighborhoods, resulting in a decline in housing rents across high $\ell$ regions.
Table A.3: Welfare Impact of Relaxing Housing Regulation (% Change)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mechanism</th>
<th>Firm (Location)</th>
<th>Housing</th>
<th>Tightness</th>
<th>Tax</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Two-sided</td>
<td>-0.023</td>
<td>-0.223</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One-sided</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>-0.395</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: The first column shows the percentage change in welfare due to firm types and to local TFP in the two-sided and one-sided sorting models, respectively.

Despite the large-scale spatial reallocation, the change in aggregate output is marginal, increasing only by 0.002%. Relocation patterns of workers and firms are highly similar, as shown in the left panel of Figure A.7. As workers are still matched with similar types of firms, in a two-sided sorting economy, the output of an individual worker remains almost the same, and so does an aggregate output. In contrast, as workers move toward large cities, congestion costs from housing and business services markets increase, leading to a decrease in GDP by 0.46%. This result is the opposite of the prediction of Hsieh and Moretti (2019). The main difference behind this discrepancy comes from the assumption of where the productivity is embodied.

Welfare decreases for most workers, with the average welfare loss of 0.21%. In Table A.3, I decompose the welfare change into four factors, as in Section 6. This is in line with the prediction that relocating workers and firms toward large cities increases congestion, leading to the negative impact stemming from the housing market channel. Second, the impact of firm productivity on welfare is negligible. Even though workers move to different locations, the corresponding relocation of firms in the new equilibrium leads to limited changes in firm productivity for each individual in their new labor markets. In Figure A.8, the blue line is near zero for all workers, and average welfare change is only -0.023%. Third, the welfare loss from market tightness is significant for workers in high-ℓ regions, offsetting all benefits from the housing market. Even workers in low-ℓ regions do not gain, as the aggregate measure of firms decreases by 0.002%. Finally, the changes in income tax and profits of intermediaries result in welfare gains. As more workers and firms move toward high-ℓ regions with higher overhead costs c(ℓ) and income tax rates τw(ℓ), a lump sum for individual workers increases. This improves the average welfare as it redistributes income to regions with lower housing rents.

Figure A.8 shows how heterogeneous workers gain or lose from each mechanism. Since there are no migration frictions, although regulation is relaxed only in concentrated areas, the changes in their value are uniform across different types of workers. However, the contribution of each mechanism differs across workers. Less productive workers are worse off from the housing market as profit redistribution Πr declines, while more productive workers in high-ℓ regions marginally benefit from the relaxed housing regulations. The impact of market tightness and firm productivity does not have systematic patterns.
Relaxing housing regulations, however, yields positive results in a one-sided sorting model. Section 6 describes a one-sided sorting model with heterogeneous workers and homogeneous firms. When productivity is embodied in locations, total output increases by 0.79% when workers move to high-$\ell$ regions. This effect dominates an increase in congestion costs so that GDP increases by 0.41%. Moreover, this positive effect translates to welfare gains of 0.66%. Table A.3 and the right panel of Figure A.8 confirm that welfare gains mostly come from local TFP channel. Additionally, the positive effect of tax also comes from local TFP, which contributes to higher incomes and thus a larger tax redistribution in the counterfactual.